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The international tax regime has wide implications for business, trade,
and the international political economy. Under current law, multinational
enterprises do not pay their fair share of taxes to market countries where
profits are generated because market countries are only allowed to tax
companies with a physical presence there. Digital companies, like Google
and Amazon, can operate entirely online, thereby avoiding market country
taxes. Multinationals can also exploit existing tax rules by shifting their
profits to low-tax jurisdictions, thereby avoiding taxes in the residence
country where their headquarters are located.
Recently, a global tax deal was reached to tackle these issues. Proposed
by the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework and endorsed by nearly 140
countries, this global tax deal sets forth two Pillars that reform the outdated
international tax regimes. Pillar One addresses digital taxation while Pillar
Two addresses a global minimum tax. However, it is doubtful that the global
tax deal will be successfully implemented, especially with respect to Pillar
One. As the details of Pillar One have become increasingly complex and
degraded by political compromises and carve-outs, it risks being a framework
without substance. Also, countries are unlikely to repeal an established tax
instrument, Digital Services Taxes (“DSTs”), which is an adamant
requirement of the United States in adopting Pillar One.
This Article offers the first comprehensive critique of the global tax deal
and assesses its prospects and problems. It evaluates the U.S. responses to the
proposed global deal and to DSTs. It presents the challenges, such as treaty
overrides, that will occur if the United States implements Pillar One by
executive agreement so as to bypass the treaty ratification. This Article
suggests separating the two Pillars to preserve the global minimum tax.
Regarding DSTs, the Article provides several empirical studies that
demonstrate the harm retaliatory tariffs cause. Finally, it endorses the U.N.
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digital taxation proposal and proposes a new Data Excise Tax as normative
alternatives.
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INTRODUCTION
On October 8, 2021, 136 countries signed on to the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”) Base Erosion and
Profit Shifting (“BEPS”) statement (“the Statement”) for reforming
international corporate taxation in the digitalized economy. 1 Now 137
countries, including not only the OECD/G20, but also most developing
countries, have joined this global tax deal. 2 This reform, although still
dependent on plan specifics in upcoming discussion and national legislation
to implement, represents the culmination of over a decade of work and
diplomacy directed towards the goal of bringing the international tax regime
into the twenty-first century.
The existing international tax regime was developed during the 1920s
and 1930s for a brick-and-mortar world. This outdated system has been
unable to address two key problems in today’s global, digitalized world. First,
multinational enterprises are currently only obligated to pay corporate
income tax in foreign market countries (or source countries) where they have
a physical presence, such as an office or factory. With tech giants such as
Google, Facebook, and Amazon now able to generate revenue from market
countries entirely online without ever establishing a physical presence, they
can avoid paying sufficient taxes to those market countries. Second,
multinational enterprises are also avoiding residence country taxes by
shifting profits to subsidiaries in low-tax jurisdictions. The intangible nature
of modern assets such as trademarks, software, and other intellectual property
allows multinationals to shift earnings and profits away from the higher
residence country taxes where their headquarters are located. The OECD
estimates that the resulting corporate tax avoidance costs could be anywhere
from $100 billion to $240 billion annually, which amounts to four to ten
percent of global corporate tax revenue.3
The global tax deal is articulated in the Statement announced in October
2021, which aims to address these tax challenges with a distinct two-pillar
system. Pillar One addresses the foreign market country taxation problem in
the global, digitalized world by modifying the profit allocation and tax nexus
1

OECD, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, STATEMENT ON A
TWO-PILLAR SOLUTION TO ADDRESS THE TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM THE
DIGTIALISATION OF THE ECONOMY (Oct. 8, 2021), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/statementon-a-two-pillar-solution-to-address-the-tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-ofthe-economy-october-2021.pdf [hereinafter STATEMENT]
2
International
Collaboration
to
End
Tax
Avoidance,
OECD
http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/.
3
OECD, OECD/G20 INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS, 5th Meeting of the Inclusive
Framework in Lima, Peru (Jun. 27–28, 2018), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/flyerinclusive-framework-on-beps.pdf [hereinafter OECD, IF FLYER].
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rules. Pillar One would allocate a part of multinationals’ residual profits to
market jurisdictions even if there is no physical presence in market countries.4
Pillar Two aims to curtail profit shifting and tax base erosion by leveling the
playing field with a fifteen percent global minimum tax.5 This Article details
the workings of this monumental new tax framework and critically assesses
its mixed prospects for success. It offers guidelines for U.S. international tax
policy and seeks to highlight alternative proposals that global policymakers
should consider.
Pillar One of the Statement includes a notable new concept, namely
Amount A. Amount A would eliminate the physical presence requirement
and allocate a portion of a multinational’s residual profits to market countries
based on a formula. Incorporating a recent proposal by the Biden
Administration, the Statement defines the scope of Amount A application as
limited to multinational enterprises with global revenue above €20 billion and
profitability above ten percent (that is, profit before tax divided by revenue).6
For these multinationals, there will be a new special purpose nexus rule
permitting allocation of Amount A to market countries when the company
derives at least €1 million in revenue from that jurisdiction. 7 But the
information revealed so far envisages far-reaching changes to the
international tax regime by partially abandoning the arm’s length principle
and the physical presence requirement in order to provide greater taxing
rights to market countries. The agreement will be implemented through a
multilateral tax treaty coming into effect in 2023.
Pillar Two envisages the implementation of a global minimum tax levied
on multinational enterprises that meet a threshold of €750 million in
revenue—regardless of the jurisdiction where they are headquartered or
operating.8 If a subsidiary’s income is taxed below the minimum tax rate,
currently proposed at fifteen percent, a parent entity would then be required
to include such income as parent company income and pay the difference in
additional taxes to its residence country. If the residence country has not
enacted this rule, the affiliated entity’s deduction would be denied, or an
equivalent adjustment would be made. As a result, Pillar Two would
accomplish the single tax principle and/or full taxation.9 Individual countries
4

See infra Part I.B.1.
See infra Part I.B.2.
6
For in-scope companies, residual profit defined as profit in excess of ten percent of
revenue will be allocated to market jurisdictions with nexus using a revenue-based allocation
key. STATEMENT, supra note 1, at 1.
7
For smaller jurisdictions with GDP lower than €40 billion, the nexus will be set at
€250,000. Id.
8
Such tax base will be determined by reference to financial accounting income. Id. at 2.
9
The single tax principle provides that corporate profits should be subject to a minimum
5
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may implement the tax policy and rules of Pillar Two through domestic
legislation, so a formal treaty agreement is not required. The OECD expects
it will be implemented by 2023. Pillar Two is addressed in a companion
article, thus this Article will not engage with it in detail.10
The successful enactment of the global tax deal, especially Pillar One
concerning digital taxation, is in peril. First, Pillar One requires a multilateral
treaty for global implementation, which is expected to amend articles on
physical presence and business profits of all existing bilateral tax treaties. It
would be logistically and politically challenging to bring almost 140
countries on board to the multilateral treaty. Furthermore, in the United
States, it would be very hard to get this through the Senate for ratification.
Even if the United States relies on an executive agreement, it would be
challenging to obtain majority support in Congress and would invite many
legal issues relating to treaty overrides by executive agreements, which is
largely uncharted legal territory.11
Second, countries may be unwilling to relinquish an established tax
instrument, Digital Services Taxes (“DSTs”). DSTs have been unilaterally
developed and implemented over the past couple of years by countries
seeking to tax the digital service activities of the world’s tech giants. DSTs
are currently in effect in the United Kingdom, France, and 15 other countries.
The European Union has proposed a similar tax for its entire 27-member bloc.
These DSTs are imposed on companies’ gross revenue, as opposed to net
income, at relatively low rates. As a result of the tax being assessed on gross
revenue, U.S. companies are unable to utilize the foreign income tax credit to
offset this tax from their U.S. tax liabilities. DSTs are imposed on the
provision of digital services, regardless of whether they are provided for free
(like Google and Facebook) or for payment (like Amazon and Netflix). They
have been criticized as discriminatory towards U.S. tech giants, and the July
2021 Inclusive Framework Statement called for the removal of unilateral
DSTs in exchange for the new Pillar One tax regime.
However, the European Union announced that it still intends to
implement its own digital levy in 2023. 12 The United Nations has also
tax and that if the country with the primary right to tax such income (source or residence)
does not impose tax at the minimum level the other country involved should tax it. For the
single tax principle, see Reuven Avi-Yonah, Who Invented the Single Tax Principle? An
Essay on the History of US Treaty Policy, 59 NYLS L. REV. 305 (2015); for full taxation,
see Ruth Mason, The Transformation of International Tax, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 353 (2020)
[hereinafter, Transformation].
10
Reuven Avi-Yonah and Young Ran (Christine) Kim, Tax Harmony: The Promise and
Pitfalls of the Global Minimum Tax, 43 MICH. INT’L L.J. (forthcoming 2022).
11
See infra Part III.A.
12
European Commission, A Fair & Competitive Digital Economy – Digital Levy,

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4068928

6

A New Framework for Digital Taxation

[29-Mar-22

announced that it is considering adding special provisions for income from
automated digital services to article 12B of the U.N. Model Tax
Convention.13
The continued use and further enactment of DSTs by individual
countries and governing entities presents a perilous obstacle to the successful
implementation of the Pillar One tax regime. A previous attempt, the OECD
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (“BEPS 1.0”) failed because the
United States resisted what it felt were discriminatory taxes against its tech
industry.14 Ironically perhaps, it was the very failure of the BEPS 1.0 tax
proposal that served as a catalyst for individual countries to begin imposing
new digital taxes unilaterally.
This Article argues that the claim that DSTs represent discriminatory
taxation against U.S. tech giants is baseless, even ironic. U.S. tech giants
dominate the world market in digital services and the primary reason that they
are predominantly affected by DSTs is because they have no real foreign
competition. If and when an Alibaba or a Tencent becomes a truly global
digital service provider, they would instantly be subject to the same DSTs.
Furthermore, DSTs cannot be dismissed solely because they are unilateral.
Sovereign countries cannot be prevented from imposing taxes on income that
they can show has been derived from their jurisdiction. The unilateral move
to implement a DST is not contrary to the “first bite at the apple” rule of
international taxation, whereby source countries have primacy in taxation
because source comes before residence in time. 15 The United States has
carried out unilateral moves in international tax for decades, without seeking
or awaiting consent from any other country. 16 Demonizing DSTs simply
because they are “unilateral” is unjustified.
Moreover, the United States’s response to the DSTs has been particularly
unsettling. The United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) adopted trade
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12836-A-fair-&competitive-digital-economy-digital-levy_en [hereinafter EU Digital Levy].
13
Comm. of Experts on Int’l Cooperation in Tax Matters, Twenty-Second Session, Item
3(i) of the Provisional Agenda, Tax Consequences of the Digitalized Economy–Issues of
Relevance for Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. E/C.18/2021/CRP.1 (2021) [hereinafter,
U.N. Proposal].
14
See generally OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL
ECONOMY, ACTION 1 – 2015 FINAL REPORT (2015) [hereinafter OECD, ACTION 1]
(describing the implementation of Action 1).
15
Reuven Avi-Yonah & Gianluca Mazzoni, Taking The First Bite: Who Should Tax
Apple’s $187 Billion In Ireland?, 3–4 (U. Mich. L.& Econ., Working Paper No. 16-033,
2017).
16
Examples include foreign tax credits, controlled foreign corporations, and denying
treaty benefits to hybrid entities. See Reuven Avi-Yonah, Constructive Unilateralism: U.S.
Leadership and International Taxation, 2–9 (U. Mich. Pub. L.& Legal Theory Rsch. Paper
Ser., Paper No. 463, 2015).
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sanctions on France (currently suspended due to the pending global
negotiations) and is threatening to adopt similar sanctions against other
countries implementing DSTs. However, the USTR investigation report on
France’s DST contains many biases and exaggerations that directly
influenced its conclusion that France’s DST is discriminatory. This Article
scrutinizes the USTR report, unpacks its notable errors, and focuses on its
selective bias and revenue threshold analysis.17 More importantly, the Article
asserts that tariffs are inefficient, regressive, and cause a net harm to
economies by raising costs for companies and consumers.18
To demonstrate this point and build a case against retaliatory tariffs, this
Article conducts the first empirical analysis of the DST tariff imposed on the
import of French sparkling wine.19 The U.S. sparkling wine importers were
chosen by the USTR as “sacrificial companies” to protect Google, Apple,
Facebook, and Amazon (“GAFA”), arguably harmed by France’s enactment
of DST. The DST tariff increased the costs to importers, and thus reduced
their profit margins, creating negative effects to the sacrificial companies that
were mostly small and medium in size. Worse, this Article reveals that the
DST retaliatory tariffs have neither caused financial harm to the French wine
industry nor have pressured France to discard its DST, thus failing to
accomplish their intended objectives.
Built upon this discussion, this Article offers policy criteria for digital
taxation.20 Reflecting the tax challenges in the digital economy, any policy
proposal should be able to overcome the outdated physical presence nexus
and fairly allocate the appropriate tax revenue to market countries.
Furthermore, an effective policy proposal should be free from any indicia of
discrimination towards companies based on their nationality. Finally, a policy
proposal needs to be administrable by both tax administrations and taxpayers
alike. A simple, targeted approach may in fact work better and more
efficiently than an ambitious, comprehensive approach that inevitably invites
political compromises.
The Article next details two compatible digital taxation proposals: a
multilateral solution and a unilateral measure. First, this Article endorses the
U.N. proposal for article 12B of the U.N. Model Tax Convention for income
from automated digital services.21 This multilateral proposal eliminates the
physical presence requirement only for certain digital services, defined as
automated digital services. Market countries can tax income from automated
17

See infra Part III.A.2.
Kimberly Clausing, The Progressive Case Against Protectionism, 98 FOREIGN AFF.
109, 115 (2019).
19
See infra Part III.A.4.
20
See infra Part IV.A.
21
See infra Part IV.B.
18
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digital services on a “gross basis” at a modest rate (three or four percent) with
an option to the taxpayer to pay tax on “net basis.” The U.N. proposal is a
much more simplified approach compared to Pillar One. It reflects the needs
of many developing countries with limited administrative capacity. Hence,
this Article believes that the U.N. proposal can serve as a simple, reliable,
and efficient method to upgrade income taxation for the digital economy
while this Article also identifying issues that can be improved.
Second, as a unilateral measure, this Article proposes a new data excise
tax, inspired by several existing proposals. 22 The tax base would be
calculated by the volume of collected data, measured in gigabytes. It would
only apply to for-profit data collectors, with a safe harbor threshold rule to
prevent taxation of individual users and small businesses. Because the
proposed tax would not be measured in gross revenue or profits, it would
likely avoid the suspicion currently directed at DSTs and accusations that it
is a disguised income tax or discriminatory tax based on nationality of the
businesses. As an excise tax, it would be easy to administer, and could be
implemented either independently by a market jurisdiction or together with a
multilateral solution. The proposed digital excise tax could serve as a model
for foreign countries as well as the European Union, which is preparing to
implement a new digital levy. As an excise tax, it is also a potential option
that states and localities could adopt.
The multilateral and unilateral proposals are compatible with each other
so that policymakers may adopt them individually or collectively. In addition,
the diversified designs provide more options for policymakers with different
propensities; the multilateral measure is based on an income tax regime,
whereas the unilateral proposal is an excise tax, which is a subcategory of
consumption tax. Such diversified designs may provide more options to a
wide array of policymakers.
This Article is the first extensive critique of the potential impacts of the
monumental global tax deal in October 2021 and assesses the prospect and
problems in reforming the international tax regime. In particular, this Article
provides several contributions.
First, by addressing the encompassing issues, this Article contributes not
only to the scholarship of international tax law and policy, but also to trade
policy, international law, and the political economy. Hence, it may resonate
with broad audiences in each field as well as to interdisciplinary readers
interested in this topic. In the same vein, this Article offers insights on the
global minimum tax in Pillar Two along with the main theme of this Article:
the digital taxation in Pillar One.

22

See infra Part IV.C.
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Second, this Article evaluates the current U.S. response to the proposed
global deal and DSTs and offers a possible action guide at both the
international and domestic level. On one hand, for the proposed global deal,
the United States maintains the position that the two Pillars are inseparable
and should be dealt with as a package deal. However, the Pillar One proposal
is not promising because it reflects so many conflicting voices. Due to the
multiple compromises, the proposal deviates from the original goal, which is
to address the tax challenges in the digital economy. It has become too
complex and has degenerated to a framework without substantive solutions.
However, the global minimum tax proposals in Pillar Two conform to the
policy goal of leveling the playing field that the United States seeks to pursue
for the purpose of promoting free trade and fair competition. Most of the
Pillar Two proposals can be implemented by domestic legislation. Thus, it is
worth considering detaching the two Pillars and pursing Pillar Two alone if
Pillar One becomes unachievable or too politically time-consuming to
complete at this time.
Third, this Article provides a balanced view towards the DSTs. It
criticizes the prevalent view of DSTs as being discriminatory, and warns of
the harm of engaging in a global trade war. However, it also notes the possible
flaws of DSTs.
Finally, the Article contributes normative alternative proposals for U.S.
and international policymakers considering digital taxation. The criteria
developed for good digital tax policy and the evaluation of the proposals
thereunder that this Article explores may hopefully offer valuable insights to
policymakers seeking to develop better tax policy.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an
overview of the history of digital tax reforms and DSTs. It also examines the
Pillar One and Two proposals in the global tax deal with greater details. Part
II reveals the legal, political, and economic challenges of the proposed global
deal. It indicates the complexity caused by multiple rounds of political
compromises and the lack of concrete solutions. Part III advises guidelines
that the United States should consider with regards to the global deal and
DSTs. It explains the dilemma that the United States might face if it uses
executive agreements to implement Pillar One, and suggests severing the two
pillar proposals and maintaining an objective perspective for DSTs. The case
studies in this Part support the argument that the United States should avoid
harmful trade war. Part IV offers normative proposals for digital taxation. It
develops important policy criteria, endorses the U.N. proposal as a
multilateral measure, and proposes a new data excise tax as unilateral
alternative. The Article concludes that the international tax reform
encompasses both revolution and evolution to which the Article aims to
contribute.
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THE EVOLUTION OF DIGITAL TAX REFORM PROPOSALS
This Part describes the history of international tax reform proposals to deal
with the tax challenges in the global, digitalized economy in the 21st century.
It starts with the BEPS 1.0 project in the first half of the 2010s, which failed
to achieve complete success due to the project’s limitation in digital taxation,
which in turn stimulated market countries to adopt unilateral tax measures.
In response, the global community launched the BEPS 2.0 project, consisting
of the two Pillars, producing the Statement in October 2021. Critical
assessment of the result will be discussed in Part II.
BEPS 1.0 and the Rise of Digital Services Taxes (DSTs)
Over the past decade, a revolution has begun in international taxation.
International taxation rules were developed in the 1920s and 1930s.23 They
have been criticized as being outdated by, for example, requiring physical
presence for nexus and vulnerable to tax competition, tax base erosion, and
profit shifting. Countries that had previously been content to live with such
outdated rules came to a collective understanding after the financial crisis of
2008-10 that the rules must be changed.
Under political pressure, the G20, comprised of the twenty largest
economies in the world, forced the OECD to begin redrafting the ground rules
of international taxation. The result was the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
(BEPS) project – BEPS 1.0 – which from 2013 to 2015 advanced fifteen
actions designed to counter multinational corporations’ ability to engage in
tax avoidance through profit shifting and other accounting measures. 24 In
2015, OECD Secretary General Angel Gurria declared that
The measures we are presenting today represent the most fundamental
changes to international tax rules in almost a century: they will put an
end to double non-taxation, facilitate a better alignment of taxation
with economic activity and value creation, and when fully
implemented, these measures will render BEPS-inspired tax planning
structures ineffective.25
23
Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U.S. International
Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1023–24 (1997).
24
OECD, BEPS Actions, https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-actions/.
25
OECD, OECD Presents Outputs of OECD/G20 BEPS Project for Discussion at G20
Finance Ministers Meeting (May 5, 2015), https://www.oecd.org/tax/oecd-presents-outputsof-oecd-g20-beps-project-for-discussion-at-g20-finance-ministers-meeting.htm.
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This declaration was overly optimistic: The G20 and OECD failed to
reach a consensus on a number of issues, the most critical of which was
Action 1, addressing the digital economy.26 While France and other European
Union members pushed for changes to existing “permanent establishment”
(“PE”) tax rules—that is, physical presence requirement for tax nexus—to
enable more source-based taxation of profits from the digital economy, the
United States resisted any attempts that would impose additional taxation on
its tech giants, such as Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Netflix.27
In the failure to achieve consensus in the OECD or a multilateral,
international system of taxation, countries unilaterally started to adopt their
own measures. The pioneer was the United Kingdom, which in 2015 adopted
a diverted profits tax (“DPT”) that taxed the tech giants on the profits of the
“avoided PE” that would have been subject to taxation if the permanent
establishment rules were different.28 The United Kingdom was followed by
Australia, which adopted the “Netflix tax,”29 and India, which adopted the
first “digital services tax,”30 a tax on the provision of digital services as well
as the use of local consumer data to sell targeted advertising (thus applying
to Amazon’s, Facebook’s, and Google’s business models). France then
adopted its own DST, which was followed by fifteen other jurisdictions
passing various iterations of a DST. 31 A broad, multilateral tax in the form
of a digital levy implemented across the entire 27-member EU bloc was also
proposed. 32 DSTs are widespread (as shown in Chart 1) and are now
26

OECD, ACTION 1, supra note 14.
Mason, Transformation, supra note 9, at 397–98 (2020); U.S. Sees Unilateral Taxes
on Web Giants As ‘Discriminatory’: Treasury Official, REUTERS (Mar. 12, 2019, 5:09 AM),
https://reuters.com/article/us-usa-tax-harter- idUSKBN1QT1CT.
28
Finance Act 2020, c. 39-72 (UK); Stephanie Soong Johnston, U.K. Digital Services
Tax Becomes Law, Stoking Trade Tensions, TAX NOTES TODAY INT’L (July 23, 2020),
https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-international/digital-economy/uk-digital-services-taxbecomes-law-stoking-tradetensions/2020/07/27/2crds?highlight=Stephanie%20Soong%20Johnston%2C%20U.K.%20
Digital%20Services%20Tax%20Becomes%20Law%2C%20Stoking%20Trade%20Tension
s.
29
Tax and Superannuation Laws Amendment (2016 Measures No. 1) Act 2016 (Austl.),
https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2016A00052; see also Lance Cunningham &
Meera Pillai, Insight: 2019 Australian “Election” Budget-Significant International Tax
Measures, BLOOMBERG LAW (Apr. 22, 2019, 12:53 AM).
30
The Finance Act, 2016 (India).
31
See e.g., Liz Alderman, France Moves to Tax Tech Giants, Stoking Fight with White
House, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/11/business/francedigital-tax-tech-giants.html [hereinafter France].
32
Proposal for a Council Directive Laying Down Rules Relating to the Corporate
Taxation of a Significant Digital Presence, COM (2018) 147 final (Mar. 21, 2018),
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/system/files/201803/proposal_significant_digital_presence_21032018_en.pdf.
27
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considered the status quo in international tax, as Michael Graetz of Columbia
Law School commented in 2019.33
CHART 1. COUNTRIES ENACTED OR PROPOSED DSTS34

The United States responded to the implementation of unilateral DSTs
by adopting trade sanctions against France—which are currently suspended
pending OECD negotiations—and threatening to do the same to other
jurisdictions.35 More detailed analysis of DSTs, the U.S. response of tariffs,
and a potential trade war is discussed infra Part III.C.
33

Michael Graetz, Professor of Tax Law, Columbia Law School, Speech at the 2019
USCIB/OECD International Tax Conference (June 3, 2019).
34
Chart 1 is created by the author based on the data released by KPMG. KPMG,
TAXATION OF THE DIGITALIZED ECONOMY 5 (July 22, 2021),
https://tax.kpmg.us/content/dam/tax/en/pdfs/2021/digitalized-economy-taxationdevelopments-summary.pdf. Below is the list of countries in Chart 1.
1) Countries where a DST has been implemented (marked in BLACK): Argentina, Austria,
France, Hungary, India (Equalisation Levy), Indonesia (Electronic Transaction Tax),
Italy, Kenya, Paraguay, Poland, Portugal (Exhibition Levy & Annual Levy), Sierra
Leone, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
2) Countries that have proposed or publicly considered a DST (marked in GRAY):
Belgium (to enact in 2023 if OECD consensus fails), Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, China,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Israel, Japan, Latvia, New Zealand, Norway,
Romania, Russia, Singapore (to enact if OECD proposal fails), Slovenia, South Africa
(to enact if OECD proposal fails), and South Korea.
3) Jurisdictions that have enacted or are considering income-tax based digital tax
approaches, such as digital PE, are not included in Chart 1: Costa Rica, Greece, Hong
Kong, Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Slovakia, Taiwan, Thailand, Uruguay,
Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.
35
Press Release, United States Trade Representative, USTR Announces Initiation of
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The Global Tax Deal Statement as BEPS 2.0
The G20 and the OECD responded to these developments in 2018 by
beginning work on BEPS 2.0. Notably, the BEPS 2.0 project has expanded
the discussion group to include both developed and developing countries,
because the international tax reform consisting of two pillars would only
succeed if they were supported by the global community. As a result, 139
countries are now participating in the OECD/G20 Inclusive Framework on
BEPS 2.0 towards the development of consensus-based, long-term
solutions.36
BEPS 2.0 consists of two pillars.37 Pillar One concerns modifying profit
allocation and nexus rules. 38 It aims to allocate a part of corporations’
residual profits to market countries even if the corporation has no physical
presence in those countries.39 Pillar Two’s provisions are a direct extension
of “global intangible low-taxed income (GILTI)” and “base erosion and antiabuse tax (BEAT),” enacted as part of the U.S. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
(“TCJA”) of 2017.40 It aims to introduce a global minimum tax to level the
Section 301 Investigation into France’s Digital Services Tax (July 10, 2019),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2019/july/ustrannounces-initiation-section-301.
36
OECD, IF FLYER, supra note 3; for the composition of the Steering Group, see OECD,
COMPOSITION OF THE STEERING GROUP OF THE OECD/G20 INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON
BEPS (2021), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/steering-group-of-the-inclusive-frameworkon-beps.pdf. Mitchell Kane and Adam Kern note this expansive group of Inclusive
Framework that has led the global tax deal and argue that Pillar One has cleared for a more
progressive international tax reform, called “progressive formulary apportionment.” They
propose to create additional item, called “Amount D,” in the Pillar One regime, which would
apportion certain amounts of nonroutine profit to developing countries based on the
economic needs rather than tax nexus to the profits. Mitchell Kane & Adam Kern,
Progressive Formulary Apportionment: The Case for ‘Amount D,’ 171 TAX NOTES FED.
1713 (2021). Although we agree that international tax policy needs to consider ‘equitable’
allocation of profits more seriously, the concept of Amount D would need further discussion
on why tax system, instead of foreign aid program for example, should be used to support
developing countries that lack tax nexus to the profits.
37
See OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION – INTERIM REPORT
2018 (2018). See also OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITALISATION
OF THE ECONOMY – POLICY NOTE, as approved by the Inclusive Framework on BEPS on 23
January 2019 (2019); and OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, SECRETARIAT
PROPOSAL FOR A “UNIFIED APPROACH UNDER PILLAR ONE (2019).
38
OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION – REPORT ON PILLAR ONE
BLUEPRINT 3 (2020) [hereinafter OECD, PILLAR ONE BLUEPRINT].
39
Id. at 8.
40
OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION – REPORT ON PILLAR TWO
BLUEPRINT: INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS, OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT
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playing field.41 Several rounds of proposals have been circulated, but this
subsection will discuss the three most important developments: (1) the Report
on Pillar One Blueprint (hereinafter, Pillar One Blueprint), 42 (2) the U.S.
proposals by the Biden Administration,43 and (3) the most recent Statement
on a Two-Pillar Solution to Address the Tax Challenges Arising from the
Digitalisation of the Economy (the Statement) released in October 2021.44
Pillar One for the Digital Economy
At the start of the BEPS 2.0 discussion, Pillar One aimed to offer new
nexus and profit allocation rules for the digital economy. It recognized that,
especially in the digital platforms where participation of users in market
countries is important, the allocation of taxing rights with respect to business
profits can no longer be determined solely by physical presence.45 The new
rules developed through BEPS 2.0 are intended to be based on net basis
taxation, to avoid double taxation, and to be as simple as possible.46
However, after several rounds of proposals for discussion and the release
of the Pillar One Blueprint, Pillar One no longer solely targets the digital
economy, especially digital platforms where the new tax challenges were
significant. It rather targets any business sector that meets revenue threshold
and profitability even if the business sector is not digital.47 This is especially
odd considering that the title of the Statement still declares that its purpose is
“to address the tax challenges arising from the digitalization of the
economy.”48 This Article suggests that the initial focus of Pillar One, which
is the digital economy, ought to be emphasized. Below are the key
developments of Pillar One.

SHIFTING PROJECT, OECD PUBLISHING, Paris, https://doi.org/10.1787/abb4c3d1-en,
[hereinafter OECD, PILLAR TWO BLUEPRINT].
41
Id. at 3.
42
OECD, PILLAR ONE BLUEPRINT, supra note 38.
43
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Presentation by the United States to the Steering
Group of the Inclusive Framework Meeting (Apr. 8, 2021) [hereinafter Treasury,
Presentation].
44
STATEMENT, supra note 1.
45
Young Ran (Christine) Kim, Digital Services Tax: A Cross-Border Variation of the
Consumption Tax Debate, 72 ALA. L. REV. 131, 155–58 (2020).
46
OECD, PILLAR ONE BLUEPRINT, supra note 38, at 10.
47
See e.g., Comment from Katherine Amos, Louise Weingrod & Kris Bodson, Johnson
& Johnson, to OECD Centre for Tax Policy and Administration on OECD Tax Challenges
Arising from Digitalisation—Report on the Pillar One Blueprint 2–3 (Dec. 14, 2020) (on file
with authors).
48
STATEMENT, supra note 1.
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a) Pillar One Blueprint
The Pillar One Blueprint, released in October 2020, is the first
comprehensive proposal to expand the taxing rights of market countries.49
The new concepts revealed in the Blueprint, called Amounts A and B, were
devised for this purpose. Amount A focuses on the new taxing right of market
countries by eliminating physical presence requirements,50 whereas Amount
B allocates certain amounts of fixed returns arising from marketing and
distribution activities to market countries where businesses have physical
presence.51 In addition to these two concepts, the other goals of Pillar One
are to significantly improve tax certainty and dispute resolution mechanisms
and to have relevant unilateral measures (such as DSTs) removed.52
Below are the key design elements of Amount A, which have shown the
most dramatic development in the subsequent negotiations.
Scope: Amount A applies only to consumer-facing businesses (“CFB”) and
businesses performing automated digital services (“ADS”).
A CFB is “a business that supplies goods or services, directly or
indirectly, that are of a type commonly sold to consumers, and/or licenses or
otherwise exploits intangible property that is connected to the supply of such
goods and services.”53 The Blueprint does not offer examples, but Chanel
(supplying luxury goods), Starbucks (supplying branded foods and
refreshments), Johnson and Johnson (supplying pharmaceuticals), and
Mercedes-Benz (supplying automobiles) would be included.54
An ADS is a service that is either: (i) on the positive list, such as online
advertising services, online search engines, social media platforms, and

49

Before the Pillar One Blueprint, the OECD released several rounds of discussion
drafts. See, e.g., OECD, PUBLIC CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, ADDRESSING THE TAX
CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITALISATION OF THE ECONOMY (Feb. 2019); OECD/G20 Inclusive
Framework on BEPS, PROGRAMME OF WORK TO DEVELOP A CONSENSUS SOLUTION TO THE
TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM THE DIGITALISATION OF THE ECONOMY (May 2019);
OECD, SECRETARIAT PROPOSAL FOR A “UNIFIED APPROACH” UNDER PILLAR ONE 8–9 (Nov.
2, 2019).
50
OECD, PILLAR ONE BLUEPRINT, supra note 38, at 8.
51
Unlike Amount A, Amount B still requires physical presence, and the results are
intended to simplify the administration of traditional transfer pricing rules based on the arm’s
length principle. Id. at 15.
52
Id. at 15–17.
53
Id. at 39.
54
See Glenn DeSouza, Blueprint on Pillar One—What’s New and Important,
BLOOMBERG TAX (Nov. 3, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://news.bloombergtax.com/transferpricing/blueprint-on-pillar-one-whats-new-and-important.
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digital content services;55 or (ii) is automated (that is, once the system is set
up the provision of the service to a particular user requires minimal human
involvement on the part of the service provider), digital (that is, provided over
the Internet or an electronic network), and not on the negative list.56
Revenue Threshold: Amount A applies to businesses only if they meet a
global and local revenue threshold. The specific amounts of these thresholds
have not been finalized, with little information provided except for a
comment stating that “there may be little advantage in using a threshold
below the current €750 million threshold . . . .” 57 At that threshold, an
estimated 2,300 multinational enterprise groups would be within the scope of
Amount A. 58 The local in-scope revenue threshold is considered so as to
exclude largely domestic businesses.
Nexus: The new nexus rule identifies which market jurisdictions qualify for
Amount A without considering the business’s physical presence. The
Amount A nexus will be recognized if local revenue from in-scope businesses
exceeds a certain amount.59 However, a specific amount has not yet been
proposed.60
Profit Allocation: The Pillar One Blueprint lays out a 3-step process for
calculating the quantum of Amount A.61
1. Calculate the amount of “residual profit,” defined as profit that
exceeds a profitability threshold (that is, pre-tax profit divided
by revenue).62 This amount is subject to profit allocation.
2. Multiply a “reallocation percentage” to residual profit. This
amount is reallocated mostly from residence countries to

55

The positive list includes online advertising services, sale or other alienation of user
data, online search engines, social media platforms, online intermediation platforms, digital
content services, online gaming, standardized online teaching services, and cloud computing
services. OECD, PILLAR ONE BLUEPRINT, supra note 38, at 25.
56
The negative list includes customized professional services, customized online
teaching services, online sale of goods and services other than ADS, revenue from the sale
of a physical good, irrespective of network connectivity (“Internet of things”), and services
providing access to the Internet or another electronic network. Id. at 33.
57
Id. at 62.
58
Treasury, Presentation, supra note 43, at 11.
59
OECD, PILLAR ONE BLUEPRINT, supra note 38, at 65.
60
For ADS, nexus is determined solely by the business’ in-scope revenue in the market
jurisdiction. The threshold is expected to be set at less than €5 million. In comparison, a CFB
is less able to participate remotely in market jurisdictions, and thus, could be subject to a
higher standard. Id. at 65–68.
61
Id. at 120.
62
The profitability threshold has not been set at that time. Assuming that it is fixed at
ten percent, an estimated 780 multinationals and $500 billion will be subject to Amount A.
Id. at 123.
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market countries because physical presence requirement is
eliminated.63
3. If there are multiple market countries, an “allocation key”
based on local in-scope revenues applies to divide Amount A
among eligible jurisdictions.
b) U.S. Comprehensive Scoping Proposal
During the Trump Administration, the United States was not supportive
of Pillar One, just as it opposed Action 1 of BEPS 1.0, because it considered
the new tax regime to be discriminatory against U.S. tech giants, putting them
at a competitive disadvantage.64 Furthermore, the United States would lose
revenue due to the expected revenue reallocation. U.S. resistance to Pillar
One was best epitomized by its safe harbor proposal, essentially making the
tax regime elective.65 The global community has criticized this attitude as
harmful to the effectiveness of the proposal.66
However, the Biden Administration appears to be more sympathetic to
the global effort, as shown by its decision to offer an alternative, called the
“comprehensive scoping” proposal and to withdraw the Trump
Administration’s safe harbor proposal. 67 The comprehensive scoping
proposal uses quantitative criteria based on revenues and profit margins to
identify the world’s largest and most profitable multinational groups,
regardless of industry classification or business model.68 Assuming that the
profitability is fixed at ten percent, the U.S. proposal drastically cuts the
number of businesses within scope from 780 to 100 or fewer.69
The comprehensive scoping approach has significant merits because it
simplifies the business line segmentation in the Pillar One Blueprint. This
segmentation is considered “the most complicated and difficult building

63
The reallocation percentage has not been set. Assuming that it is fixed at twenty
percent, the allocable tax base will be approximately $98 billion. Id. at 124.
64
Channing Flynn & Jennifer Cooper, BEPS Action 1 - Where Are We?, INT'L TAX REV.
(Oct. 26, 2017), http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3762337/BEPS-Action1Where-are-we.html.
65
Andrea Shalal, et al., U.S. Drops ‘Safe Harbor’ Demand, Raising Hopes for Global
Tax Deal, REUTERS (Feb. 26, 2021, 11:16 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-g20-usaoecd/u-s-drops-safe-harbor-demand-raising-hopes-for-global-tax-deal-idUSKBN2AQ2E6.
66
US Suggests Safe Harbour Regime for OECD Pillar One Proposal, TAX J. (Dec. 11,
2019),
https://www.taxjournal.com/articles/us-suggests-safe-harbour-regime-for-oecdpillar-one-proposal.
67
Stephanie Soong Johnston, U.S. Offers Key to Unlock Scope Issue in Global Tax
Reform Talks, 102 TAX NOTES INT’L 147 (2021).
68
Treasury, Presentation, supra note 43, at 12.
69
Id. at 11.
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block” of Pillar One.70 However, some major market players have criticized
the arbitrariness of the approaches cut-off of 100 multinational enterprises,
regardless of the type of business. Non-digital multinationals, like Johnson &
Johnson, have argued that they would be included in top 100 multinationals,
but there is no reason for them to be subject to the Pillar One regime because
the misalignment between value creation and taxation does not occur in their
type of business.71 Given that the purpose of Pillar One is to recognize a new
tax nexus for digital businesses that do not have any physical presence in
market countries and to reallocate the profits to market countries accordingly,
requiring non-digital companies with physical presence in major market
countries to comply with the new regime would waste time and money.
c) The Global Tax Deal Statement
On July 1, 2021, the Inclusive Framework Statement was released as a
preview of the global tax deal,72 followed by the final Statement released on
October 8, 2021. The global tax deal is now supported by 137 countries and
jurisdictions, their support represents more than ninety percent of global
GDP. 73 The noticeable difference in the Statement from the previously
released Pillar One Blueprint was the scope of Amount A. The Statement
abandons the industry-based approach, and instead adopts a quantitative
approach based on the gross revenue and profitability of businesses.
Although its language differs from that of the U.S. comprehensive scoping
proposal, the end result effectively follows the U.S. proposal by drastically
cutting the number of in-scope businesses from 780 to 78 of the world’s
largest companies. 74 Amount A will be implemented by a multilateral

70

Id. at 18.
See e.g., JOHNSON & JOHNSON COMMENTS ON OECD TAX CHALLENGES ARISING
FROM DIGITALISATION—REPORT ON THE PILLAR ONE BLUEPRINT 2 (2020); Michael J.
Graetz, A Major Simplification of the OECD’s Pillar 1 Proposal, 101 TAX NOTES INT’L 199,
203 (2021) (also criticizing that the exclusion of financial services is likely political).
72
OECD, STATEMENT ON A TWO-PILLAR SOLUTION TO ADDRESS THE TAX CHALLENGES
ARISING FROM THE DIGITALISATION OF THE ECONOMY, (Jul. 1, 2021),
https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/statement-on-a-two-pillar-solution-to-address-the-taxchallenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy-july-2021.htm [hereinafter IF
STATEMENT].
73
STATEMENT, supra note 1; OECD, 130 COUNTRIES AND JURISDICTIONS JOIN BOLD
NEW FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM (July 1, 2021),
https://www.oecd.org/newsroom/130-countries-and-jurisdictions-join-bold-newframework-for-international-tax-reform.htm [hereinafter OECD, Press Release].
74
Treasury, Presentation, supra note 43, at 11; Michael Devereux & Martin Simmler, Who
Will Pay Amount A?, ECONPOL POL’Y BRIEF, OXFORD UNIV. CTR. BUS. TAX’N, 3 (2021).
71
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instrument (treaty) that is expected to be developed and opened for signature
in 2022 and be effective in 2023.75
After examining the Statement’s Amount A, Table 1 compares the
Statement to its previous incarnation under the Pillar One Blueprint.76
Scope:77 A multinational is within the scope of Amount A if its global
turnover exceeds €20 billion and its profitability exceeds ten percent.
Profitability is determined by dividing pre-tax profit by revenue. Pillar One
is to be reviewed seven years after it takes effect. If its implementation is
found to be successful, the turnover threshold will be reduced to €10 billion.
The Statement excludes extractives (non-renewable resources such as
petroleum and minerals) and regulated financial services (banking, insurance,
and asset management).
Nexus: 78 A market jurisdiction has nexus when an in-scope business
derives at least €1 million in revenue from that jurisdiction. For a smaller
jurisdiction (those with a GDP of less than €40 billion), the nexus threshold
is €250,000.
Profit Allocation (Quantum):79 Twenty-five percent of the residual profit
of an in-scope business will be allocated to market jurisdictions with nexus,
whereby residual profit is defined as profit in excess of ten percent of
revenue. A revenue-based allocation key will be used.
Revenue Sourcing:80 The source rules determine when revenues of an
in-scope business arise in, and thus are sourced to, the end market
jurisdictions–that is, the place where goods and services are used or
consumed. The OECD has subsequently released the Draft Model Rules for
detailed source rules for specific categories of transactions. Notably, revenue

75

STATEMENT, supra note 1, at 3.
Technical elements, such as revenue sourcing, tax base, and elimination of double
taxation are omitted here, but included in Table 1.
77
STATEMENT, supra note 1, at 1.
78
Id. The OECD has released draft model rules for nexus and revenue sourcing, where
the nexus test remains as set out in the Statement. OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT
SHIFTING PROJECT, PILLAR ONE – AMOUNT A: DRAFT MODEL RULES FOR NEXUS AND
REVENUE SOURCING, ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT 5
(Feb. 4, 2022), https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/public-consultation-document-pillar-oneamount-a-nexus-revenue-sourcing.pdf [hereinafter OECD, DRAFT MODEL RULES].
79
Id. at 2.
80
STATEMENT, supra note 1, at 2.
76
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is sourced on a transaction-by-by-transaction basis,81 and all revenues must
be sourced using reliable indicators.82
TABLE 1. KEY DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE PILLAR ONE BLUEPRINT AND
THE STATEMENT.
Pillar One Blueprint
Automated digital services
(ADS) and Consumerfacing business (CFB)

Scope

Nexus

Profit
Allocation/
Quantum
Revenue
Sourcing

Tax Base

Elimination
of
Double
Taxation
Amount B

Tax Certainty

Based on local revenue
from in-scope;
Specific
amount
not
proposed
Three-step calculation;
Specific ratio or threshold
not proposed
Sourced to end-market
jurisdictions where goods
or services are used or
consumed;
Source
rules
to
be
developed for specific
categories of transactions
Determined by reference to
financial
accounting
income;
Loss carry-forward
Exemptions or credits

Standardize
arms-length
principle to in-country
baseline marketing and
distribution activities
Mandatory and binding
dispute prevention and
resolution mechanisms for
Amount A-related issues.

Statement
Global turnover > €20 billion;
Profitability >10%;
Excludes extractives and regulated
financial services
Revenue of in-scope business from
jurisdiction > €1 million ( €250,000 for
smaller jurisdictions)
25% of residual profit;
Revenue-based allocation key
The same; The Draft Model Rules
proposing that revenue is sourced on a
transaction-by-transaction basis

The same; Segmentation to occur only in
exceptional circumstances, in which
disclosed segments meet the scope rules
The same; Safe harbor for marketing and
distribution profits to be developed
To be simplified and streamlined by the
end of 2022

Elective for certain developing countries

The Draft Model Rules defines a “transaction” as an item that generates income, such
as an individual item of inventory or a “click” on an online advertisement. However, further
guidance on the transaction-by-transaction approach is left to the Commentary to the Model
Rules, which has not been released. OECD, DRAFT MODEL RULES, supra note 78, at 5.
82
Id. at 6.
81
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Pillar Two for Global Minimum Tax
Pillar Two builds on the TCJA’s GILTI and BEAT taxes in
implementing the single tax principle,83 where multinational enterprises that
meet the €750 million revenue threshold are subject to a global minimum tax
regardless of the jurisdiction where they are headquartered or operating.84
Pillar Two consists of (1) two interlocking domestic rules requiring income
inclusion (“Income Inclusion Rule”” or “IIR”) and denial of deduction
(“Undertaxed Payment Rule”” or “UTPR”), together referred to the Global
anti-Base Erosion (GLoBE) rules, and (2) a treaty-based rule (Subject to Tax
Rule, or STTR).85
The Income Inclusion Rule requires the residence country of
multinationals to impose top-up tax on a parent entity at a minimum rate
(fifteen percent) if the source country where the parent entity’s subsidiary
operates imposes a tax below such minimum rate on the subsidiary’s income.
If the residence country does not impose such minimum tax, the subsidiary’s
deduction for payment to the parent entity would be denied or an equivalent
adjustment would be required as per the Undertaxed Payment Rule to the
extent the low tax income of a subsidiary is not subject to tax under an IIR.
For example, suppose that a subsidiary in the source country earns $100 of
income and the source country imposes tax at ten percent, which is below the
fifteen percent global minimum tax rate. Then the residence country of the
subsidiary’s parent entity would include the $100 with the parent’s income
and impose tax at a rate that is equal to the difference between the global
minimum rate and the ten percent tax rate the subsidiary paid on the $100 in
its low-tax jurisdiction. Suppose further that the subsidiary pays the $100 to
the parent in a deductible form, such as royalty. If the residence country does
not have the IIR, the subsidiary’s deduction for the $100 royalty payment will
be denied.
Subject to Tax Rule, on the other hand, is a standalone treaty rule and
specifically targets intercompany payments that exploit treaties to shift
profits to low-tax jurisdictions. 86 Therefore, this rule applies to certain
categories of payments that present a greater risk of base erosion, such as
interest and royalties.87 For example, suppose that a subsidiary in the source
country pays $100 of royalty to a parent, and the parent’s $100 of royalty
income is subject to a nominal tax rate below the minimum rate (currently
83
Lilian V. Faulhaber, Taxing Tech: The Future of Digital Taxation, 39 VA. TAX REV.
145, 175 (2019) [hereinafter Taxing Tech].
84
STATEMENT, supra note 1, at 3–5.
85
OECD, PILLAR TWO BLUEPRINT, supra note 40, at 14 ¶ 8.
86
Id. at 150 ¶ 566.
87
Id. at 150 ¶ 568.
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suggested from 7.5 percent to nine percent) in the residence country. Then,
the source country is allowed to impose withholding tax on the royalty
payment at a rate that is equal to the difference between the minimum rate
provided for under the STTR and the nominal tax rate.88
The Pillar Two tax regime is quite complex, and much work still needs
to be done to determine the details.89 However, Pillar Two is expected to
reduce profit shifting by multinationals. If enough large economies agree to
implement Pillar Two, there will be no incentive for companies to put their
businesses through low-tax jurisdictions.
In short, Pillar One is a reform to strengthen source-based taxation. It is
the most effective way to eliminate profit shifting and tax competition given
the location of customers. Pillar Two takes a different approach by
strengthening residence-based taxation. Firms would no longer have
incentive to change their place of residence or location of headquarters.

PROBLEMS OF THE PROPOSED GLOBAL DEAL
The world seems to agree that the OECD’s tax reform plan is an overdue
and necessary update for the digital age.90 On July 11, finance ministers from
the G20 announced the G20’s endorsement of the OECD’s changes to
international tax rules.91 As of November 4, 2021, 137 out of 141 IF member
countries and jurisdictions have agreed to two-pillar proposal for reforming
the international tax system.92 The response from world leaders, journalists,
tax organizations, business leaders and public interest groups has remained
overwhelmingly positive. According to U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen,
there is growing consensus that the OECD plan is the right path to
establishing a tax regime that is fair for all.93
However, the United States, the European Union, and other proponents
of the global tax deal must first address several major obstacles to the global
88

Id. at 165 ¶ 650.
See e.g., Avi-Yonah & Kim, supra note 10; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The New
International Tax Framework: Evolution or Revolution?, AM. SOC. INT’L L. (July 7, 2021),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/25/issue/11.
90
OECD Sees Global Minimum Accord Improving Tax System: Cormann, BLOOMBERG
TV (Jul. 8, 2021, 9:56 AM MDT), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2021-0708/oecd-sees-global-minimum-accord-improving-tax-system-cormann-video.
91
Natalie Olivo, New Global Tax Rules May Face Old Treaties, Other Hurdles, LAW360
(Jul. 12, 2021, 7:33 PM), https://www.law360.com/tax- authority/articles/1402215/newglobal-tax-rules-may-face-old-treaties-other-hurdles.
92
STATEMENT, supra note 1, at 1.
93
Christopher Condon, G-20 Finance Chiefs Back Tax Deal and Vow to Clear Hurdles,
BLOOMBERG (July 10, 2021), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-0710/yellen-optimistic-congress-will-back-part-of-global-tax-deal [hereinafter G-20].
89
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tax deal. Crucially, many sensitive and substantive issues regarding Pillar
One have been deferred to a potential multilateral instrument, a draft of which
will not be ready until later in 2022. It is less likely that the supportive press
coverage would continue as more specific details of the tax plan are
negotiated, and compromises must inevitably be made. Here are some of the
key problems of the proposed global deal:
An Agreement, Not a Solution
The Statement is an eight-page document discussing both pillars, whereas
the combined Blueprint for both pillars is about five hundred pages long. Part
I.B introduces only the key elements of both documents, but the Statement,
especially with regards to Pillar One, is no more than a general statement that
leaves details to be determined in a future multilateral instrument that will be
developed later in 2022. There have been major developments since the
Blueprint, such as the dramatic change in the scope of Amount A. The Pillar
One Blueprint was criticized as a compromise of too many previous
proposals, for being too complex, and for deviating from the original tax
problem of the digital, global economy. Given that the Statement makes yet
another major shift, it needs to provide a policy explanation for doing so.
However, the Statement is silent on the reason for the change, not to mention
its implications for tax authorities and taxpayers, inviting this Article’s
critical assessment.
The general nature of the Statement may reflect a political and
diplomatic desire to encourage as many countries as possible to join in.
However, if the world reaches an agreement on the Statement only because
it dodges sensitive issues, it can hardly be considered a long-awaited solution
for international tax reform. Such an agreement would be a mere political
event to boast a nominal achievement to domestic constituents, and would
only invite more discord among the IF member states. As details of the plan
are negotiated and compromises inevitably made, support from the member
states and the press is likely to wane. The following sections identify and
discuss grounds for discord.
Logistical and Political Challenges of Pillar One
Pillar One will be implemented by a multilateral instrument—that is, a
treaty—that is expected to be signed later in 2022 and take effect in 2023.94
However, multilateral instruments and tax treaty ratification are plagued by
various challenges, such as achieving consensus between nearly 140

94

STATEMENT, supra note 1, at 3.
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countries, the distinct rules and political realities of each country’s legal
system, and logistical challenges to implementation and adherence.
Achieving consensus among the global community has proved to be a
challenge in the past. For example, international negotiations regarding the
BEPS 1.0 project were ongoing for nearly eight years without consensus as
to how the international tax regime should change.95 There are relatively few
successful multilateral tax conventions, and the multilateral agreements that
do exist are typically smaller in scope and consist of a smaller number of
countries as parties. 96
The immense logistical challenges of implementing a multilateral tax
agreement between nearly 140 countries is exacerbated by the reality that the
OECD international tax plan would control relationships between countries
that may not have relationships governed by existing bilateral treaties.97 This
raises complex concerns related to binding dispute resolution, introducing
another element of political tension among some in the global community.98
In addition, even after consensus is reached, it takes time for each
country to ratify treaty amendments. In the case of the 2015 BEPS 1.0 tax
treaty amendment, many countries took months to years to sign the
multilateral instrument, and others, including the United States, have never
ratified it.99
Gary B. Wilcox & Warren Payne, Hitching Biden’s Corporate Tax Proposals to the
Global Tax Bandwagon, TAX NOTES (June 21, 2021), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notestoday-federal/corporate-taxation/hitching-bidens-corporate-tax-proposals-global-taxbandwagon/2021/06/21/76lr5?highlight=ratification%20challenges%20multilateral%20trea
ties#76lr5-0000040.
96
Mary C. Bennett, Contemplating a Multilateral Convention to Implement OECD
Pillars 1 and 2, TAX NOTES (Jun. 16, 2021), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-todayinternational/base-erosion-and-profit-shifting-beps/contemplating-multilateral-conventionimplement-oecd-pillars-1-and2/2021/06/16/76k35?highlight=ratification%20challenges%20multilateral%20treaties#sec1.
97
See Id. (“The new multilateral treaty will also need to govern relationships between
countries that do not have any existing treaty relationship, which means its drafters will need
to think about the ancillary issues that might otherwise be left to the bilateral treaty.”).
98
Developing countries typically oppose mandatory binding arbitration but developed
countries with large multinationals subject to Pillar One largely support mandatory binding
dispute resolution. These conflicts are not directly related to the substantive tax reforms, but
impact the probability of reaching a consensus.
99
For a graphic indicating the length of time, see (@DanNeidle), TWITTER (Jul. 2, 2021,
3:56
AM),
https://web.archive.org/web/20210702095624/https://twitter.com/DanNeidle/status/141090
0061740011521 (showing that the following countries failed to ratify the 2015 BEPS
amendments are the Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Bulgaria, China, Columbia, Fiji, Gabon,
Hong Kong, Italy, Kuwait, Mexico, Romania, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Spain,
Turkey, Cameroon, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, Jamaica, Tunisia, Peru, Belize, Papua new
Guinea, Morocco, Kenya, North Macedonia, Bahrain, and the United States).
95
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Furthermore, political realities in the United States illustrate the
complexities of ratifying a multilateral tax instrument. There is little
likelihood that the global tax deal will be passed by the U.S. Congress in a
single bill, increasing the difficulty of ratification in the U.S. Senate.
Additionally, the United States has yet to ratify the 2015 BEPS tax treaty
amendments, 100 indicating that despite executive intent to comply with
international agreements, it is not always possible under the constraints of the
U.S. legal system.
The Pillar One multilateral treaty will alter U.S. bilateral treaties with
other countries, and therefore will need to be ratified by two thirds of the U.S.
Senate.101 However, getting 17 Republicans to support a treaty measure that
many view as penalizing U.S. companies may be a non-starter in the current
economic and political climate.102 Senate approval of the Pillar One treaty in
any form will almost certainly require the inclusion of a ban on all current
and future DSTs, including the proposed E.U. digital levy.103
Pillar Two, on the other hand, is generally compatible with existing tax
treaties and the GLoBE rules, the main part of Pillar Two, can likely be
implemented with changes to domestic tax legislation.104 However, the Biden
Administration’s attempt to use the reconciliation process, which only
requiring a majority vote, to push through changes related to Pillar Two’s tax
reform plan in the Build Back Better Act and negotiate with the Senate on
Pillar One at a later, has not been successful. 105 Furthermore, a potential
treaty override issue is expected as to the Pillar One implementation, which
is discussed further in Part II.A.

100

OECD, SIGNATORIES AND PARTIES TO THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION TO
IMPLEMENT TAX TREATY RELATED MEASURES TO PREVENT BASE EROSION AND PROFIT
SHIFTING (Feb. 9, 2021) (showing that the United States is not listed as a signatory).
101
Lilian Faulhaber, Will the OECD Plan Fix International Taxation? LAW360 (Jul. 7,
2021, 5:41 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1400693.
102
Mindy Herzfeld, Pushing Pillar 1 Past Congress, TAX NOTES (Jul. 19, 2021),
https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-federal/fundamental-tax-systemstructure/pushing-pillar-1-past-congress/2021/07/19/76vyv?highlight=base%20erosion.
103
Stephanie Soong Johnston, Crapo and Brady Urge Yellen to Push for Immediate End
to DSTs, TAX NOTES (Jul. 12, 2021), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-federal/digitaleconomy/crapo-and-brady-urge-yellen-push-immediate-enddsts/2021/07/12/76rtc?highlight=OECD; Theodoric Meyer and Jacqueline Alemany, BBB
Negotiations Stall in the Senate, Could Drag into Next Year, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2021,
6:29 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/12/17/bbb-negotiations-stallsenate-could-drag-into-next-year/.
104
Faulhaber, Taxing Tech, supra note 83.
105
Stephanie Soong Johnston, Reconciliation Bill May Have Global Minimum Tax
Provisions, TAX NOTES (Jul. 12, 2021), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notesfederal/politics-taxation/reconciliation-bill-may-have-global-minimum-taxprovisions/2021/07/12/76rl1?highlight=Pillar%201.
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The OECD global tax reform has the public support and momentum to
take it over the finish line. However, the piecemeal implementation of the
plan that will likely happen in the United States will unfortunately create a
moment where good faith and trust will be required between the United States
and the European Union in order for the plan to be fully implemented. If the
European Union and United Kingdom make the good faith gesture of
abandoning the digital tax levy and immediately repealing their DSTs, there
might be at least a possibility that the U.S. Senate would ratify Pillar One and
the OECD tax plan will be fully implemented throughout much of the world.
However, if the European Union continues to claim that a digital levy is not
a digital tax, and its individual countries engage in brinkmanship with the
United States regarding DST repeal, the U.S. Senate will likely reject or
decline to vote on Pillar One and there will be only partial worldwide
implementation of the OECD plan.
Repeal of Existing DSTs and Potential Digital Levy
The possibility of delayed U.S. passage of Pillar One adds further
murkiness to the issue of the European Union digital tax levy and the
unilateral DSTs that have currently been enacted by a number of countries.
Pillar One could be in jeopardy if the European Union moves forward with
its digital tax levy and its individual members drag their feet in repealing their
unilateral DSTs.
Many commentators expect that countries that currently have DSTs – for
example, France, Canada, Italy, and India – may be reluctant to repeal at least
until the United States actually implements Pillar One.106 In fact, the United
States later made individual agreements with the United Kingdom, France,
Italy, Spain, and Austria that resulted in the retention of their digital taxes for
now.107 If the OECD-brokered global overhaul is implemented by 2023, the
countries will offer a credit to refund any taxes collected in excess of what
corporations would pay under the global tax deal.108 This means that the five
major advanced economies will preserve DSTs if the global tax deal
eventually fails, and that taxpayers have to deal with DSTs for the time being.
In that case, the world might have partial implementation of the two-Pillar
106

Natalie Olivo, Digital Taxes May Linger After Global Deal, Panelists Say, LAW360
(Jul. 14, 2021, 5:27 PM), https://www.law360.com/tax-authority/articles/1402957/digitaltaxes-may-linger-after-global-deal-panelists-say-.
107
Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, USTR Welcomes
Agreement with Austria, France, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom on Digital Services
Taxes (Oct. 21, 2021), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2021/october/ustr-welcomes-agreement-austria-france-italy-spain-and-unitedkingdom-digital-services-taxes (indicating DSTs will be removed once Pillar 1 is in effect).
108
Id.
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tax plan. Also, if DSTs are still in place, the United States may end up
imposing punitive tariffs again, the ramifications of which are discussed infra
Part III.C.
Furthermore, the European Union is preparing a new digital levy,
asserting that the new digital levy will be compatible with the two-pillar
proposal.109 If the European Union goes forward with a digital levy after the
global tax deal is finalized, it is likely that the United States will reject Pillar
One.110
Despite the Statement’s mandate to repeal their DSTs and refrain from
introducing others in the future, U.S. lawmakers remain skeptical. Two top
Republican senators sent a letter to Treasury Secretary Yellen on July 8,
2021, asserting that Congress will not support an OECD tax reform deal
unless it protects the U.S. economy, including the instant repeal of DSTs.111
Revenue Competition from Benefits of Tax Reform
The need to reform the century-old international tax system and the
revenue benefits resulting from such reform have been the main drivers
behind nearly 140 countries agreeing to the proposed global tax reform plan.
It is estimated that Pillar One, the new nexus and profit allocation rules, will
reallocate profits of $100 billion to market countries annually.112 The vast
majority of the states joining the global tax deal would likely see a revenue
increase as a result of Pillar One.113 Simultaneously, Pillar Two, the global
minimum corporate income tax of fifteen percent, is expected to generate
approximately $150 billion in additional global tax revenues each year.114
Hence, from a global perspective, the global tax reform will benefit the

109

EU Digital Levy, supra note 12.
Elodie Lamer, Growing Unease in EU Over Global Tax Deal’s Next Steps, TAX
NOTES (Jul. 12, 2021), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-international/corporatetaxation/growing-unease-eu-over-global-tax-deals-nextsteps/2021/07/12/76rz4?highlight=OECD.
111
Letter from Mike Crapo and Kevin Brady, U.S. Senators, to Janet Yellen, U.S.
Treasury Secretary (July 8, 2021).
112
OECD, Press Release, supra note 77.
113
Robert Goulder, The Cost of Change: Pillar 1 Reduced to the Back of a Napkin, 103
TAX NOTES 111 (July 1, 2021) https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-todayinternational/international-taxation/cost-change-pillar-1-reduced-backnapkin/2021/07/06/76qdb?highlight=Global%20Minimum%20TaX [hereinafter, Cost of
Change].
114
Id.
110

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4068928

28

A New Framework for Digital Taxation

[29-Mar-22

world.115 The IMF, representing an additional fifty-one countries, also backs
the plan.116
CHART 2. APPROXIMATE NET REVENUE GAIN FROM PILLAR ONE117

However, individual counties’ interests may not exactly align with the
collective benefits. Each country would like to secure net revenue gain rather
than loss. Chart 2 shows a preliminary, back-of-a-napkin estimate based on
calculations completed by Dan Neidle, a Clifford Chance tax attorney from
London. Countries like the United Kingdom and China would essentially
break even under Pillar One’s profit reallocation regime after factoring in the
cost of crediting.118 Notably, the United States will experience the greatest
loss under Pillar One’s profit reallocation regime: $10.3 billion each year
115

William Horobin, Global Tax Overhaul Endorsed by 130 Nations as Deal Gets
Closer,
BLOOMBERG
(Jul.
1,
2021,
11:42
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-07-01/global-tax-overhaul-endorsed-by130-nations-as-deal-gets-closer.
116
Eric Martin, IMF Sees Room to Simplify Global Tax Deal to Boost Participation,
BLOOMBERG (Jul. 10, 2021, 3:54 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-0710/imf-sees-room-to-simplify-global-tax-deal-to-boost-participation.
117
Dan Neidle (@DanNeidle), TWITTER (Jun. 16, 2021, 6:40 AM),
https://web.archive.org/web/20210616124055/https://twitter.com/DanNeidle/status/140514
3274403270662 (underlying data available at https://github.com/DanNeidle/pillar_one).
118
See Goulder, Cost of Change, supra note 113 (this calculation considers the cost of
foreign tax credit).
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despite a revenue increase of $12.6 billion.119 It may be considered obvious
considering that the U.S. corporate community disproportionately consists of
in-scope taxpayers, namely tech companies. Then the question arises as to
why the United States would go along with Pillar One unless there is a quid
pro quo, namely other countries repealing DSTs and adopting Pillar Two.
On the contrary, Treasury Secretary Yellen contends that Pillar One
would be revenue neutral for the United States. 120 To reconcile Secretary
Yellen’s statement with Neidle’s calculations, a tax commentator Robert
Goulder explores the idea that she made different assumptions regarding
foreign tax credits or that she meant the operation of Pillars One and Two
jointly would create a revenue neutral result for the United States.121 Another
interpretation may be that acceptance of Pillar One by other countries with
the mandate that they repeal DSTs and reduce discrimination against U.S.
multinationals may offset losses under Pillar One. Nonetheless, these are all
speculation, and the U.S. government has not disclosed its own calculation.
Putting aside the revenue competition among countries, let us turn to the
taxpayers. Who will be liable to the new tax under the tax reform? In other
words, is Pillar One free from the criticism that it is discriminatory against
U.S. tech giants? A calculation focusing on the composition of Pillar One’s
Amount A implies that the answer is no. Michael Devereux and Martin
Simmler of Oxford University indicate that the extent of Pillar One will only
apply to 78 of the world’s 500 largest companies.122 The aggregate Amount
A allocation for the 78 companies subject to Pillar One is approximately $87
billion.123 Strikingly, sixty-four percent of Amount A profits will come from
companies headquartered in the United States.124 Contrast this with the fact
that the United States only comprises twenty to twenty-five percent of world
GDP.125 Furthermore, around forty-five percent of the aggregate Amount A
119

Id. (this calculation considers the cost of foreign tax credits which, if offered, would
be extensive and result in the U.S. experiencing a net loss under Pillar One).
120
See Letter from Janet Yellen, U.S. Treasury Secretary, to Mike Crapo, U.S. Senator
(Jun. 4, 2021) (“[O]ur Pillar 1 comprehensive scope proposal will be largely revenue neutral
for the United States since we will be on both the receiving and giving end of the proposed
profit reallocation.”).
121
Goulder, Cost of Change, supra note 113; Robert Goulder, The Cost of Change, Part
II: Rethinking U.S. Exposure to Pillar 1, TAX NOTES (Jul. 20, 2021),
https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-international/international-taxation/cost-changepillar-1-reduced-backnapkin/2021/07/06/76qdb?highlight=Robert%20Goulder%2C%20The%20Cost%20of%20
Change%20Pillar%201%20Reduced%20to%20the%20Back%20a%20Napkin.
122
Devereux & Simmler, supra note 74.
123
Id. at 1.
124
Id. at 4.
125
THE WORLD BANK, GDP (current US$), (last visited Jul. 30, 2021),
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD.
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allocation will come from technology companies, with approximately thirtytwo percent coming from Apple, Microsoft, Alphabet, Intel, and Facebook.126
Consequently, the discrimination issue may persist under the Pillar One
regime.

HOW SHOULD THE U.S. RESPOND?
This Part evaluates the current U.S. response to the proposed global deal
for digital tax reform and DSTs and offers a possible action guide at both the
international and domestic level. Section A explains various legal issues that
the United States might face if it uses executive agreements to implement
Pillar One to bypass the treaty ratification in Senate. Thus, Section B suggests
severing the two pillar proposals to save at least a global minimum tax in
Pillar Two. Section C suggests avoiding a global trade war even if Pillar One
fails and, as a result, DSTs survive, by offering a case study on France’s DST.
The Inherent Difficulty with Treaty Override
Part II.B. expects that Pillar One tax regime will have difficulty passing
Congress. The United States may not expect to implement Pillar One as a
multilateral tax treaty as proposed by the OECD because, with the
Republican’s opposition, it is impossible to get two thirds of the votes in
Senate. The United States may try a congressional executive agreement with
a majority vote in both houses,127 but that still needs to be an override of
articles 5 (permanent establishment), 7 (business profits), and 9 (associated
enterprises) of the existing bilateral tax treaties.
Unfortunately, use of “treaty override” to implement Pillar One in the
United States is a double-edged sword for proponents of international tax

126

Devereux & Simmler, supra note 74, at 1.
SENATE MEMBER LETTER TO SECRETARY YELLEN (October 08, 2021) [hereinafter
Letter
Oct.
8],
https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/crapo_risch_toomey_letter_to_treasury.pdf
; SENATE MEMBER LETTER TO SECRETARY YELLEN (Dec. 22, 2021) [hereinafter Letter Dec.
22],
https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/republican_letter_to_treasury_oecd.pdf; see
also Senate Office of Mike Crapo, Finance Republicans Demand Treasury Analysis of
OECD
Agreement
(Dec.
22,
2021),
https://www.crapo.senate.gov/media/newsreleases/finance-republicans-demand-treasuryanalysis-of-oecd-agreement; Senate Office of Rob Portman, Portman, Senate Finance
Republicans Demand Treasury Analysis of OECD Agreement (Dec. 23, 2021),
https://www.portman.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/portman-senate-financerepublicans-demand-treasury-analysis-oecd-agreement.
127
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law.128 While enactment by the United States is essential for the effectiveness
of Pillar One, the foundation of international law would be weakened with
each treaty override.129
Overview of Treaty Overrides
a) Definition
In 1989, the OECD issued its report on “Tax Treaty Override.” 130 It
defined a “treaty override” as a “situation where the domestic legislation of a
State overrules provisions of either a single treaty or all treaties hitherto
having had effect in that State”, and recommended States to “avoid enacting
legislation which is intended to have effects in clear contradiction to
international treaty obligations.”131
However, such a traditional definition would be too narrow to explain a
more recent phenomenon in international law. The expected executive
agreement to implement Pillar One is a good example. If the United States
implements the Pillar One tax regime by an executive agreement, that will
override existing bilateral tax treaties. Will it also be a “treaty override”?
Another definition that better encompasses the ways in which an override can
occur, describes a treaty override as “when a contracting state [to a treaty]
intentionally applies domestic law or regulation to accomplish specifically
what a treaty forbids.”132 According to this definition, executive agreements
128
See generally, C De Pietro, Tax Treaty Override and the Need for Coordination
between Legal Systems: Safeguarding the Effectiveness of International Law, 73 WORLD
TAX J. (2015); Craig Elliffe, Preventing Unacceptable Tax Treaty Overrides, BRITISH TAX
REV. (forthcoming 2022); Rebecca M. Kysar, Interpreting Tax Treaties, 101 IOWA L. REV
1387, 1397–1404 (2016); OECD, Tax Treaty Override (adopted by the OECD Council on
Oct. 2, 1989) [hereinafter OECD 1989 Report]; Georg Kofler, Legislative Tax Treaty
Overrides in Austrian, German, and EU Law, BRITISH TAX REV. (forthcoming); Nicola
Sartori, Tax Treaty Override and Pacta Sunt Servanda: The Italian Perspective, BRITISH TAX
REV. (forthcoming).
129
OECD 1989 Report, supra note 128, at 4; see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Sunt Pacta
Servanda? The Problem of Tax Treaty Overrides, BRITISH TAX REV. (forthcoming 2022)
(manuscript at 8) (on file with authors); see generally RICHARD E. ANDERSEN, ANALYSIS OF
UNITED STATES INCOME TAX TREATIES (2010); Nicolas M. Traut, Tax Treaty Overrides And
Friendliness Towards International Law: A Comparative Approach To Put The LaterIntime-Rule To The Test, 48 CAPITAL U. L. REV. 403, 411–2; KLAUS VOGEL, TAX TREATIES
AND DOMESTIC LAW (2006).
130
OECD 1989 Report, supra note 128.
131
OECD, Recommendation of the Council concerning Tax Treaty Override,
OECD/LEGAL/0253
(Oct.
1,
1989),
https://legalinstruments.oecd.org/en/instruments/OECD-LEGAL-0253
132
Richard L. Doernberg, Overriding Tax Treaties: The U.S. Perspective, 9 EMORY
INT'L L. REV. 71, 74 (1995).
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that contradict the existing tax treaties would be considered treaty overrides
as well.
b) Monist/Dualist Distinction
The possibility of a treaty override is also state specific. It depends on
the specific constitutional system and the legal mechanisms in each country.
States that legally permit treaty overrides are labeled dualist States and those
that do not are labeled monist States.133
In many countries, treaties (including tax treaties) have a legal status
superior to that of ordinary domestic laws (for example, France, Italy,
Netherlands). 134 These countries are considered monist states. The monist
view sees both international and domestic law as intrinsically part of the legal
system, and international law becomes automatically a part of the domestic
legal system. This means that a treaty which is validly executed in the
international legal sense automatically takes full legal effect within domestic
law. Subsequent general domestic tax legislation would not normally
override a treaty.135
However, some countries like the United States and United Kingdom
view domestic legislation and international treaties as separate regimes of
law. 136 International law (the treaty) regulates the relationship between
sovereign states, but domestic law regulates legal matters relevant to that
country. 137 These so-called dualist states only apply treaty provisions to
domestic law when they are expressly incorporated into domestic
legislation.138
The United States is noted by many scholars as being the classic example
of a dualist overriding state.139 The U.S. Constitution lays out that “[l]aws of
the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme law of the land.”140 This Supremacy Clause was intended to
ensure the supremacy of both U.S. federal laws and treaties to state laws, and
133

Elliffe, Preventing, supra note 128, at 4; De Pietro, supra note 128, at 85–87; Sachin
Sachdeva, Tax Treaty Overrides: A Comparative Study of the Monist and the Dualist
Approaches, 41 INTERTAX 180 (2013).
134
Avi-Yonah, Sunt Pacta Servanda?, supra note 129, at 6–7.
135
Id. at 6–7.
136
Elliffe, Preventing, supra note 128, at 5–6; De Pietro, supra note 128, at 85–87
(2015); Sachdeva, supra note 133.
137
Sachdeva, supra note 133.
138
Id.
139
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter VCLT]; see e.g., Avi-Yonah, Sunt Pacta Servanda?, supra note 129, at 11.
140
U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
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was one of the major innovations in the Constitution.141 Accordingly, when
treaties and state law conflict, treaties trump. However, the Constitution is
less clear about the relationship between federal laws and treaties. Despite
the lack of clarity in the Constitution, the U.S. Supreme Court has
nevertheless established the principle of lex posterior, meaning that the later
law prevails. In other words, the U.S. system operates on the notion that the
most recent expression of the sovereign is the governing law. 142 This
mechanism has allowed the United States to override several international
treaties.
c) When Has an Override Occurred?
An important distinction to note with treaty override is that unlike the
termination of a treaty, a treaty override unilaterally changes provisions in a
treaty for one party but keeps the treaty in effect.
There are two ways that a treaty override can take place. First are explicit
overrides, where the legislative intent to override a specific treaty is clear.143
This usually comes with an explicit statement.144 Second, implicit overrides
are more challenging for courts to decipher. In these cases, it largely comes
down to interpretation. 145 For example, “[r]ecently, the issue of implicit
treaty overrides has become ‘hot’ again because of the debate over whether
some provisions of the [TCJA] were an override.”146
Accordingly, given that treaty overrides can occur both explicitly and
implicitly, it is unclear in many dualist states exactly when an override has
occurred and whether the legislature must be explicit about it or not.147 To
add some clarity, the OECD has put out two examples for the discussion to
build on in its 1989 Report.
Example 1 is a straightforward case of a material breach of the treaty, in
which a state introduces a new withholding tax on interest or royalties when
these should be exempt from source-based taxation under the treaty. The
141
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah and Brett Wells, The Beat and Treaty Overrides: A Brief
Response to Rosenbloom and Shaheen, 7 (UNIV. MICH. LAW & ECON. Working Papers,
2018).
142
Id.
143
See Avi-Yonah, Sunt Pacta Servanda?, supra note 129, at 7; Traut, Tax Treaty
Overrides, supra note 129.
144
See Avi-Yonah, Sunt Pacta Servanda?, supra note 129, at 7; Traut, supra note 129;
Omri Marian, Unilateral Responses to Tax Treaty Abuse: A Functional Approach, 41
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1157 (2016).
145
See e.g., Kofler, supra note 128 (providing a discussion on when domestic legislation
becomes and override). This was a topic of discussion during the symposium and almost all
the scholars highlighted that override are largely a matter of interpretation.
146
Avi-Yonah, Sunt Pacta Servanda?, supra note 129, at 14.
147
See Kysar, supra note 128, at 1397–1404.
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OECD 1989 Report states that “[t]he breach being a material one, the treaty
partners of State A would be justified in terminating their tax treaty
relationship with State A. However, termination could do even more harm
economically and endanger the possibility of finding an acceptable solution
in the future.”148 However, it is hard to find an actual example on which this
scenario is based, and thus, this example is not helpful to clarify the situation
when an override has occurred.149
Example 2 is a more realistic one: State B taxes capital gains from the
sale of real property, but under its tax treaties is precluded from taxing capital
gains on sales of stock. Taxpayers interpose a State B corporation between
themselves and the real property and sell the shares in the corporation instead.
State B legislates that the sale of the stock is deemed to be a sale of the real
property for purposes of its treaties. 150 This example is based on the U.S.
Foreign Investors in Real Property Tax Act of 1980, which explicitly
overrode Art. 13 (capital gains) of most U.S. tax treaties in order to impose
tax on the sale of shares in U.S. real property holding companies.151 In short,
there is no guidance that helps clarifying the implicit overrides.
d) International Law on Treaty Overrides
It is commonly recognized that if a state overrides a treaty, it is a
volitation of international law according to the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties (“VCLT”).152 This is true even in countries that have not
formally ratified the VCLT, as the VCLT is considered customary
international law even in countries such as the United States.153 To elaborate,
Article 26 of the VCLT articulates the pacta sunt servanda principle. 154
148

OECD 1989 Report, supra note 128, at 9.
Note that the BEAT, which arguably partially imposes tax on interest and royalties
paid by the U.S. taxpayer to related foreign parties by partially denying deductibility, does
not violate Arts. 11 and 12 of U.S. tax treaties (reducing to zero the U.S. withholding tax on
interest and royalties) because the BEAT is imposed on the U.S. payor and Art. 1(4) (the
saving clause) of all US tax treaties states that the treaty will not affect U.S. taxation of its
residents. But the BEAT does arguably violate Art. 24 (non-discrimination) which is not
subject to the saving clause, and if so to have effect in treaty situations it must be an override.
See Avi-Yonah & Wells, supra note 140, at 6.
150
OECD 1989 Report, supra note 129, at 9–10.
151
Avi-Yonah, Sunt Pacta Servanda?, supra note 129, at 9–10; Internal Revenue Code
§ 897.
152
See e.g., id. at 6–7.
153
Id. at 7.
154
VCLT, supra note 139, at art. 26 (“[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties
to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”); see also Avi-Yonah, Sunt Pacta
Servanda?, supra note 129, at 7; Craig Macfarlane Elliffe, The Lesser of Two Evils: Double
149
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Article 26 states that “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it
and must be performed by them in good faith.”155 Moreover, Article 27 adds
that “[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification
for its failure to perform a treaty.”156 Combining these two articles, “it is clear
that treaty overrides constitute a violation of international law.”157
This interpretation has been confirmed by the OECD, which strongly
condemns any treaty overrides: “The OECD Report [also] clarifies that such
treaty overrides violate international law (citing the VCLT), although they
may still be binding as a matter of domestic law.”158 In addition, the OECD
Report specifically stated that “[t]he certainty that tax treaties bring to
international tax matters has, in the past few, been called into question, and
to some extent undermined, by the tendency in certain countries for domestic
legislation to be passed or proposed which may override provisions of tax
treaties.” 159
However, in the event of an override, there are few remedies for foreign
countries other than termination of the entire treaty – which is a rarely taken
step.160 In the event of a tax treaty dispute, it can only be adjudicated and
remedied if both countries agree to submit the dispute to the International
Court of Justice.161 As a result, dualist countries such as the United States are
unlikely to end their policy of treaty overrides through domestic legislation.
Implementation in Other Jurisdictions
As discussed in Part II.B. and the Statement, Pillar One is intended to be
implemented through a multilateral treaty.162 The multilateral treaty “will be
developed to introduce a multilateral framework for all jurisdictions that join,
regardless of whether a tax treaty currently exists between those
jurisdictions.”163
Tax Treaty Override or Treaty Abuse?, 1 BRITISH TAX REV. 62, 70 (2016) [hereinafter,
Elliffe, Abuse].
155
VCLT, supra note 139, at art. 26, 27; see also Elliffe, Abuse, supra note 154, at 71;
Traut, supra note 129, at 411–12.
156
VCLT, supra note 139, at art. 27.
157
Avi-Yonah, Sunt Pacta Servanda?, supra note 129, at 8; see also OECD 1989
Report, supra note 129, at 4.
158
Avi-Yonah, Sunt Pacta Servanda?, supra note 129, at 9; see OECD 1989 Report,
supra note 129, at 4.
159
OECD 1989 Report, supra note 129, at 2; see Avi-Yonah, Sunt Pacta Servanda?,
supra note 129, at 8; see generally RICHARD E. ANDERSEN, ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES
INCOME TAX TREATIES (2010); Traut, supra note 135, at 411–2; VOGEL, supra note 129.
160
Avi-Yonah, Sunt Pacta Servanda?, supra note 135, at 9–10.
161
Elliffe, Preventing, supra note 128, at 15.
162
STATEMENT, supra note 1, at 3.
163
Id.
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Given this intended strategy, it is unlikely that there will be many major
obstacles, outside of the United States, for implementing the global tax deal.
Most OECD member countries signed the multilateral instrument for BEPS
1.0, besides the United States, and it proved a success not only for
implementing new tax policy but for how treaties in general might be
implemented in other areas of international law.164 However, it is still useful
to investigate how implementation in other OECD countries would work as
well.
a) Common Law Countries
Common law countries, except for the United States, tend to be dualist
states. These states include: the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand,
Canada, Israel, India and South Africa.165 In each of these countries, Pillar
One can only take domestic legal effect after additional domestic legislation
is adopted by the respective parliaments.166 In other words, when these States
sign the multilateral treaty, the international obligations associated with Pillar
One will be in effect, but additional steps are required on the domestic plain
to implement Pillar One. The OECD stated, however, that if members to the
multilateral treaty “need to make changes to domestic law to implement the
new taxing rights over Amount A… [to] facilitate consistency in the approach
taken by jurisdictions and to support domestic implementation consistent
with the agreed timelines and their domestic legislative procedures, the
[Inclusive Framework] has mandated the [Task Force on the Digital
Economy] to develop model rules for domestic legislation by early 2022 to
give effect to Amount A.” 167 In addition, “the model rules will be
supplemented by commentary that describes the purpose and operation of the
rules.”168 Therefore, implementation in each of these states should be fairly
smooth.

164

OECD, Signatories and Parties to the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax
Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (December 4, 2021),
https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/beps-mli-signatories-and-parties.pdf; see also David
Kleist, The Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent
BEPS—Some Thoughts on Complexity and Uncertainty, 1:31-48 NORDIC TAX J. 30 (2018).
165
David
Sloss,
Domestic
Application
of
Treaties
3
(2011),
https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1620&context=facpubs#:~
:text=twenty%2Done%20states%20include%20five,Israel%20and%20the%20United%20K
ingdom.
166
Id.
167
STATEMENT, supra note 1, at 7.
168
Id.
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b) Continental European/Civil Law Jurisdictions
Most Continental European states and most civil law jurisdictions are
monist states, making implementation through the multilateral treaty
streamline in these jurisdictions. Prominent examples include Belgium,
France, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Russia, and Spain.169 In the
E.U., the analysis of implementation is slightly different, but any involvement
by the E.U. would only make implementation within the European block
more likely.
In fact, on December 22, 2021, the E.U. Commission (Commission)
published a legislative proposal for a Directive to implement the rules of
Pillar Two. 170 By presenting the draft Directive, the Commission is
essentially proposing a binding instrument ensuring the implementation of
Pillar Two by all 27 E.U. Member States. The Commission proposes that the
Member States adopt the Directive into their domestic legal systems by
December 31, 2022 for the rules to come into effect as of January 1, 2023,
with the exception of the UTPR, for which the application will be deferred to
January 1, 2024.171
The question now is whether there will also be a directive to implement
Pillar One. This would seem entirely unnecessary if there is a multilateral
treaty, as proposed by the OECD, but the E.U. Commission has indicated that
they may propose such a directive anyway.172 This may be helpful in the case
there is an unresolved conflict between the multilateral treaty and any given
bilateral tax treaties. In such a case, a directive could create an umbrella treaty
override for all member states. Therefore, based on these developments, it
seems likely that Pillar One will be implemented fairly smoothly in most
monist jurisdiction, especially within the European block.
Implementing Pillar One from the U.S. Perspective
Given the current international legal climate and the rules regarding treaty
overrides, what are the ways in which the United States might implement
Pillar One and what are the consequences of a particular path? As mentioned,

169

See Sachdeva, supra note 139.
Eur. Comm’n, COUNCIL DIRECTIVE laying down rules to prevent the misuse of
shell entities for tax purposes and amending Directive 2011/16/EU (Dec. 22, 2021),
https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/system/files/202112/COM_2021_565_1_EN_ACT_part1_v7.pdf.
171
Id.
172
Charlotte Kies, Agreement on Pillar One and Pillar Two global tax reform, LOYENS
& LOEFF (Oct. 11, 2021), https://www.loyensloeff.com/lu/en/news/articles-andnewsflashes/agreement-on-pillar-one-and-pillar-two-global-tax-reform-n23713/.
170
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the United States would also have to override several bilateral tax treaties in
order to implement Pillar One. What are the options?
a) Ways Treaties Are Implemented
Implementation analysis in the United States, and override analysis in
this case, is somewhat complicated. As discussed above, there are different
types of international agreements the United States makes from a domestic
perspective, even though the obligation is all the same from an international
perspective. Therefore, determining the domestic status of an international
agreement requires looking at the type of agreement the United States is
entering. The United States distinguishes between three types of international
agreements: (1) treaties, (2) executive agreements, and (3) non-legal
agreements, which involve the making of so-called “political commitments,”
(which are less relevant in this Article).173
(1) Treaties:
Under U.S. law, “a treaty is an agreement negotiated and signed by a
member of the executive branch that enters into force if it is approved by a
two-thirds majority of the Senate and is subsequently ratified by the
President.” 174 The Treaty Clause—Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the
Constitution—vests the power to make treaties in the President, acting with
the “advice and consent” of the Senate. There is much debate about exactly
what “advice” and “consent” means, but the “advice” aspect has generally
come to mean that President should consult with the Senate during the treaty
negotiation process before the Senate votes with its final “consent.” 175
173

Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control Over International
Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1207–09 (2018); CONG. RSCH. SERV., TREATIES AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, 106–
97, at 4 (2001) [hereinafter TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS].
174
CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32528, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND AGREEMENTS: THEIR
EFFECT UPON U.S. LAW 3 (2018) [hereinafter CRS INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS]; see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 101
(1987) [hereinafter THIRD RESTATEMENT].
175
CRS INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 174, at 3; see also, LOUIS HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 177 (2d ed. 1996) (“As originally
conceived, no doubt, the Senate was to be a kind of Presidential council, affording him
advice throughout the treaty-making process and on all aspects of it . . . .”); Arthur Bestor,
“Advice” from the Very Beginning, “Consent” When the End Is Achieved, 83 AM. J. INT’L
L. 718, 726 (1989) (“[T]he use of the phrase ‘advice and consent’ to describe the
relationship between the two partners clearly indicated that the Framers’ conception was of
a council-like body in direct and continuous consultation with the Executive on matters of
foreign policy.”).
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Moreover, under established U.S. practice, the President cannot ratify a treaty
unless the President accepts the Senate’s conditions.176 In other words, the
Constitution allocates primary responsibility for entering into treaties to the
executive branch, but Congress also plays an essential role in the process.
In addition, treaties can be self-executing or non-self-executing. A selfexecuting treaty may be enforced in the courts without prior legislation by
Congress, whereas a non-self-executing treaty may not be enforced in the
courts without prior legislative “implementation.”177 Self-executing treaties,
for example, have a status equal to federal statute, superior to U.S. state law,
and inferior to the Constitution. Courts generally have understood treaties
that are not self-executing generally to have limited status domestically;
rather, the legislation or regulations implementing these agreements are
controlling.
In particular, U.S. tax treaties have been regarded as self-executing since
the first treaty (with France) was ratified in 1932, but there is debate regarding
whether they should not be self-executing.178 In addition, Section 894(a) of
the Internal Revenue Code requires that "[t]he provisions of this title shall be
applied to any taxpayer with due regard to any treaty obligation of the United
States which applies to such taxpayer," 179 which, many scholars argue,
indicates that legislation is not required to bring tax treaties into force.180
(2) Executive Agreements:
Most international agreements that the United States enters are not
treaties, but executive agreements—“agreements entered into by the
executive branch that are not submitted to the Senate for its advice and
176

CRS INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 174; United States v. Stuart, 489
U.S. 353, 374–75 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[The Senate] may, in the form of a
resolution, give its consent on the basis of conditions. If these are agreed to by the
President and accepted by the other contracting parties, they become part of the treaty and
of the law of the United States. . .”).
177
See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89
AM. J. INT'L L. 695, 695 (1995) (providing a useful breakdown of the nuances between selfexecuting and non-self-executing agreements).
178
See generally, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Tax Treaties, the Constitution, and the
Noncompulsory Payment Rule, MICH. L. & ECON. RSCH. PAPER SERIES, Paper No. 21-011
(2021).
179
26 U.S.C. § 894(a) (2021).
180
Columbia Marine Servs., Inc. v. Reffet Ltd., 861 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1988) (assuming
that a tax treaty is self-executing); BORIS BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS (2012) ("Tax treaties are ratified by the Senate
alone and are regarded as self-executing, which means that they have the force of law even
though not enacted as a statute."); Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law in the
Age of Treaties, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 892, 923 (2004).
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consent.”181 These agreements can be categorized into three sub-categories
based on the source of the President’s authority to conclude the agreement.182
First are congressional-executive agreements. The constitutionality of
congressional-executive agreements is well-settled.183 Essentially, they are
different from treaties where only the Senate plays a role in approving the
agreement because in such cases “both houses of Congress are involved in
the authorizing process for congressional-executive agreements.”184 In other
words, both houses of Congress are involved to pass a statute implementing
the provisions of the international agreement that was made by the
President/Executive with prior approval of the Congress.185
Second are agreements made pursuant to treaties. These are agreements
made in harmony with existing treaties. These types of agreements are also
well established as constitutional,186 “though controversy occasionally arises
as to whether a particular treaty actually authorizes the Executive to conclude
an agreement in question.” 187 “Because the Supremacy Clause includes
treaties among the sources of the “supreme Law of the Land,”188 the power
to enter into an agreement required or contemplated by the treaty lies within
the President’s executive function.189
Third are sole executive agreements. These are agreements when the
President acts without any approval from Congress. They agreements rely on
neither treaty nor congressional authority to provide their legal basis, but are
instead based on the executive authority of the President outlined in the
Constitution. 190 “The Constitution may confer limited authority upon the
181

CRS INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 174, at 6.
Id.
183
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 174, at §303(2).
184
CRS INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 174, at 7.
185
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 173, at 5.
186
See THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 174, at § 303(3); TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 173, at 86; see also Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S.
524, 528–29 (1957) (giving effect to an executive agreement defining jurisdiction over
U.S. forces in Japan that was concluded pursuant to a treaty).
187
CRS INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 174, at 7; see also TREATIES AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 173, at 86–87 & n.117 (2001)
(discussing examples in which Members of the Senate contended that certain executive
agreements did fall within the purview of an existing treaty and required Senate approval).
188
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“[T]he laws of the United States . . . [and] all treaties
made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land . . . .”).
189
CRS INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 174, at 7.
190
See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003) (“[O]ur cases
have recognized that the President has authority to make ‘executive agreements’ with other
countries, requiring no ratification by the Senate . . . this power having been exercised
since the early years of the Republic.”); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680
182
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President to promulgate such agreements on the basis of his foreign affairs
power.”191 One prominent example that the Supreme Court has recognized is
the Presidential power to conclude sole executive agreements in the context
of settling claims with foreign nations. Conversely, if the President acts under
authority that he does not have, or his constitutional authority over the subject
matter is unclear, “a reviewing court may consider Congress’s position in
determining whether the agreement is legitimate.” 192 When the Court
analyses such cases, when “Congress has given its implicit approval to the
President entering the agreement, or is silent on the matter, it is more likely
that the agreement will be deemed valid.”193
In sum, both treaty implementation and treaty override could occur
through the domestic legislation, ratification through the Senate, or through
an executive agreement, depending on the President’s Constitutional
authority. These aspects make the U.S. system both unique and complicated
for discussing both treaty implementation and treaty overrides.
b) Pillar One: Executive Agreement?
There has been long-standing scholarly debate over whether certain
types of international agreements may only be entered as treaties, subject to
the advice and consent of the Senate, or whether a congressional-executive
agreement may serve as a constitutionally permissible alternative.194 In the
(1981) (recognizing presidential power to settle claims of U.S. nationals and concluding
“that Congress has implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by executive
agreement”); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (“[A]n international
compact . . . is not always a treaty which requires the participation of the Senate.”).
191
CRS INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 174, at 7—8; see also TREATIES
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 173, at 5 (citing U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 1 (executive power), § 2 (commander in chief power, treaty power), § 3 (receiving
ambassadors)).
192
CRS INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 174, at 8; see e.g., Dames & Moore
v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (upholding sole executive agreement concerning the
handling of Iranian assets in the United States, despite the existence of a potentially
conflicting statute, given Congress’s historical acquiescence to these types of agreements);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of
Congress, his powers are at their maximum . . . . Congressional inertia, indifference or
quiescence may . . . invite, measures of independent Presidential responsibility . . . . When
the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress,
his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers
minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”).
193
Id.
194
Compare Bradford C. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements, 93 VA. L.
REV. 1573, 1661 (2007) (arguing that the text and drafting history of the Constitution support
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scholarly debates, “[a] central legal question…concerns whether the U.S.
federal government, acting pursuant to a treaty, may regulate matters that
could not be reached by a statute enacted by Congress pursuant to its
enumerated powers under Article I of the Constitution.” 195 Moreover, it
appears that tradition also plays in a role in which direction implementation
goes.
Bringing this discussion into the context of Pillar One, tax agreements
have traditionally been implemented as self-executing treaties.196 Therefore,
based on current scholarly and political debates, implementing Pillar One and
overriding other bilateral tax treaties in the process, via another mechanism
such as a congressional-executive act, would be highly irregular and raise
Constitutional questions.
There is concern surrounding implementation of Pillar One, however,
due to the fact that treaties require Senate ratification with a of two-thirds
majority. Therefore, implementing Pillar One in the current political climate
seems difficult, if not impossible. The Treasury, recognizing the current
political obstacles, commented on behalf of the administration in October
the position that treaties and executive agreements are not interchangeable, and also arguing
that the Supremacy Clause should be read to generally preclude sole executive agreements
from overriding existing law); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously:
Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221,
1249–67 (1995) (arguing that the Treaty Clause is the exclusive means for Congress to
approve significant international agreements); John C. Yoo, Laws as Treaties?: The
Constitutionality of Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REV. 757, 852 (2001)
(arguing that treaties are the constitutionally required form for congressional approval of an
international agreement concerning action lying outside of Congress’s constitutional powers,
including matters with respect to human rights, political/military alliances, and arms control,
but they are not required for agreements concerning action falling within Congress’s powers
under Art. I of the Constitution, such as agreements concerning international commerce);
with THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 174, at § 303 n.8 (“At one time it was argued that
some agreements can be made only as treaties, by the procedure designated in the
Constitution. . .Scholarly opinion has rejected that view.”); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 217 (1996) (“Whatever their theoretical merits, it is
now widely accepted that the Congressional-Executive agreement is available for wide use,
even general use, and is a complete alternative to a treaty . . . .”); Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties'
End. The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117
YALE L.J. 1236, 1244 (2008) (claiming that “weight of scholarly opinion” since the 1940s
has been in favor of the view that treaties and congressional-executive agreements are
interchangeable); Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 799, 861-96 (1995) (arguing that developments in the World War II era altered
historical understanding of the Constitution’s allocation of power between government
branches so as to make congressional-executive agreement a complete alternative to a treaty).
195
CRS INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS, supra note 174, at 9.
196
See, e.g., IRS, United States Income Tax Treaties - A to Z,
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/international-businesses/united-states-income-tax-treatiesa-to-z.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4068928

29-Mar-22]

A New Framework for Digital Taxation

43

2021 on this issue and suggested that the Administration might push to
implement Pillar One by another means. 197 Yellen specifically noted at a
Senate Banking Committee hearing that the Administration is considering
alternative means for significantly modifying existing bilateral tax treaties
that would bypass Senate approval.198 Yellen said that implementing Pillar
One via a treaty “would be one way” to do it, but there are also a “a number
of ways” it could be implemented.199 Expanding on the potential direction of
the Treasury, another Treasury official stated that implementation “could
occur through several means, such as through an Article II treaty,
congressional executive agreement or through legislation overriding the
existing treaties.”200
As indicated, perhaps the Executive could implement the treaty via a
congressional-executive agreement, which would only require a simple a
majority in the House and the Senate. However, Democrats control the Senate
with a simple majority of 50 seats, making it practically uncertain.
Furthermore, several Senators from the Foreign Relations Committee and the
Finance Committee sent letters to the Treasury expressing their concern about
these discussions. In one letter dated October 8, 2021, the Senators stated that
the changes brought by Pillar One would a be a:
“fundamental change in taxing rights [and] would require provisions
within all of the United States’ existing bilateral tax treaties to be
modified or overridden. Each of these bilateral tax treaties was approved
in the same manner—by a two-thirds vote of the Senate. Sweeping
changes to modify these treaties and alter long-established protocols
under these agreements must be processed through the same
constitutionally mandated process. Bypassing this process to override our
bilateral tax treaties would irreparably erode the exclusive treaty authority
the Constitution provides to the Senate.”201
In addition, the Senators stated that they were not aware of any prior approval
to make such an agreement from Congress, and they have not been involved
in the negotiation process on Pillar One at any step.202

197

Letter Oct. 8, supra note 127; Letter Dec. 22, supra note 127; see also Senate Office
of Mike Crapo, supra note 127; Senate Office of Rob Portman, supra note 127.
198
Letter Oct. 8, supra note 127.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
Id.; Letter Dec. 22, supra note 127; see also Senate Office of Mike Crapo, supra note
127; Senate Office of Rob Portman, supra note 127.
202
Senate Office of Rob Portman, supra note 127.
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c) Analysis/Conclusion
These responses raise questions regarding the treaty implementation
process in the United States, but there are no clear answers because this is
largely uncharted legal territory. Nevertheless, running through the
alternative options, the only real plausible alternative to treaty ratification
would be a congressional-executive agreement. The Constitution likely does
not give the President sole power to implement a tax treaty, no existing
treaties would give the President the power to implement such a substantive
tax overhaul, and Pillar One is not simply a “political commitment” to
improve the international tax regime. Pillar One requires a number of serious
changes to the tax code. Therefore, based on this analysis, pursuing a
congressional-executive agreement as an alternative method of
implementation looks more like a political calculation that a legal
determination.
If the Administration does try to implement Pillar One with a
congressional-executive agreement, there are two major political
considerations that must be taken into account. First, implementing Pillar One
through a congressional-executive agreement would be a break from
precedent. This would be the first time a substantive tax treaty would be
implemented outside of the formal treaty ratification process. The
Administration needs to determine if implementing Pillar One and overriding
existing bilateral treaties via an alternative means is worth the benefits of the
global tax deal, because there will likely be domestic political backlash in
some form. The backlash could make it harder to implement other
international agreements in the future.
Second, it is uncertain whether a congressional-executive agreement is
a practical alternative, considering that Democrats control the Senate with a
simple majority of 50 seats. Furthermore, if the President moves forward with
overriding existing bilateral treaties and implementing Pillar One via a
congressional-executive agreement, due to the lex posterior rule and the
letters from the conservative members of the Senate, it seems like bypassing
the traditional treaty process would put Pillar One on precarious ground. In
other words, there would be little to stop Conservatives from passing
legislation that overrides Pillar One the next time Congress is controlled by
the Republican Party if the Administration does not work in a bipartisan
fashion now. In addition, by all signs, it seems like Republicans would not be
concerned with overriding Pillar One, despite the international obligation the
United States is put under.
Overall, this Article is skeptical about the successful implementation of
Pillar One by the United States. This Article is sympathetic about the
government’s frustration on the treaty ratification process that has not be
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fruitful for over a decade. Yet, if an executive agreement would be used to
bypass the treaty ratification process, there may be doubt about the legality
of the U.S. instrument for implementation. Unfortunately, this Article cannot
find a move to resolve this dilemma when it comes to Pillar One. However,
there may still be guidelines or alternatives if we are willing to curb
enthusiasms in Pillar One. The remainder of this Article offers some idea.
Sever the Two Pillars
One objective of the OECD and the United States is to adopt both Pillars
One and Two as a package deal. Both pillars address the tax challenges in the
digitalized economy and combat the base erosion and profit shifting by
multinationals. However, Pillars One and Two are conceptually distinct from
each other—Pillar One strengthens source-based taxation, whereas Pillar
Two reinforces residence-based taxation. There is no logical reason to treat
the two Pillars as “linked by more than just politics,” as the United States
argues.203
More practically, the formulae for successful implementation are quite
different from each other. Pillar One is proposed to be implemented by a
multilateral instrument. Therefore, even if consensus is reached, each country
will likely need to amend its local laws to adhere to Pillar One. Making these
changes within existing political and legal systems will take time and may
raise difficult issues of complexity and implementation, especially for
developing countries with limited tax administration resources. Moreover,
Pillar One requires all countries to give up on existing DSTs, and as noted
above it may be politically onerous to persuade countries to abandon an
established tax that is quite prevalent.204 The United States, on the other hand,
is unlikely to adopt Pillar One unless all countries abandon the DSTs.
Although the multilateral solution to Pillar One orchestrated by the
OECD is not promising, there are in fact alternatives to Pillar One. The
United Nations offers another multilateral solution for taxing the digital
economy in article 12B of the UN Model Tax Convention.205Large market
jurisdictions from which most of the profits are derived can implement a
unilateral measure to deal with the tax challenges relating to Pillar One—
namely, tax nexus and profit allocation. India has shown with its fractional
apportionment proposal that a large market jurisdiction has the requisite data
to singlehandedly adopt this alternative measure. 206 DSTs or other digital
203
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levies, such as a Data Excise Tax discussed infra Part IV.C., are viable
unilateral alternatives to Pillar One.
Pillar Two, on the other hand, can be implemented by domestic
legislation alone —at least the Globe rule, the main part of Pillar Two. It is a
much better condition for initial implementation than Pillar One. Still,
international cooperation is further required to make Pillar Two truly
effective and successful, because if a country adopts too high a minimum tax
unilaterally, it risks driving multinationals to establish their headquarters in
other residence countries that do not have such a minimum tax. That is why
the United States, when it adopted GILTI unilaterally in the TCJA of 2017,
applied a very low tax rate (10.5 percent) which is much too low as a
minimum tax.207 Moreover, over ninety percent of large multinationals are
headquartered in the G20, so only a relatively small number of countries need
to agree to implement an effective minimum tax.
In short, Pillar Two is a low-hanging fruit to combat the international tax
challenges in the digital era compared to Pillar One. But Pillar Two still
requires international cooperation, which can be obtained by the forthcoming
global deal. In contrast, Pillar One faces copious obstacles that are unlikely
to be resolved by the forthcoming global deal and subsequent implementation
process. However, there are alternatives worth considering.
For these reasons, this Article contends that the two Pillars should be
separated. The United States seems to push the repeal of DSTs not only as a
condition of U.S. support for Pillar One, but also a condition for Pillar Two,
essentially making the two Pillars indivisible.208 However, risking Pillar Two
to salvage Pillar One is unwise. The United States should proceed with
negotiations to adopt Pillar Two even if Pillar One fails.
Avoid a Trade War
The United States is the loudest voice against DSTs, claiming that DSTs
violate international law because they are designed specifically to target U.S.
companies.209 The United States has signaled several times that it is willing
profit margin of a multinational based on publicly available financial data, and then allocates
the requisite percentage of that profit to itself using a formula, which can be either wholly
sales based or (as India has proposed) a balanced formula that takes into account both
demand and supply factors in generating profits. No other country needs to cooperate and in
the case of large markets, multinationals are unlikely to respond by pulling out. The risk of
double taxation can be alleviated by a balanced formula, but such a move will also put
pressure on other countries to adopt similar formulas.
207
I.R.C. § 250.
208
Treasury, Presentation, supra note 43, at 7.
209
See Ruth Mason & Leopoldo Parada, Company Size Matters, 2019 BRIT. TAX REV.
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to start a global trade war to protect U.S. multinationals from discriminatory
DSTs.
However, will starting a global trade war accomplish the United States’
goals or protect U.S. multinationals from DSTs? This section provides a case
study about a 2019 dispute between the U.S. and France, and concludes that
some of the USTR’s claims are flawed and that a trade war should be avoided.
The U.S. Trade Representative’s Investigation
When the United States believes a foreign country has engaged in
discriminatory or objectionable trade practices that disadvantage U.S.
companies, its first course of action is to begin an investigation under Section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974.210 Section 301 essentially grants the United
States the authority to engage in a trade war with countries who have
discriminatory policies. 211 Alternatively, the United States can file a
complaint with the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) and utilize the
WTO’s forum to settle trade disputes with foreign governments.212
One contentious move against foreign DSTs began in 2019, against
France. The USTR initiated its investigation of France’s DST under Section
301 in July 2019, focusing on the discriminatory and unreasonable elements
of the tax policy,213 and determined that France’s DST was “unreasonable or
discriminatory” and “particularly burdensome for U.S. companies.”214 Based
on this finding, the USTR initially proposed a 100 percent tariff on a variety
of French products, including luxury goods and sparkling wine in December
2019,215 with an import trade value of $2.4 billion.216 After subsequent public
comments and hearings, the USTR concluded that appropriate action was a

610, 646–49 (2019); Ruth Mason & Leopoldo Parada, Digital Battlefront in the Tax Wars,
92 TAX NOTES INT’L 1183, 1193–96 (2018).
210
19 U.S.C. §§ 2411–2420 (2018).
211
19 U.S.C. § 2411. Under Section 301, the USTR is to first determine whether one of
three types of acts, policies, or practices of a foreign country are present: 1) trade agreement
violations, 2) acts, policies, or practices that are unjustifiable and burden or restrict U.S.
commerce, and 3) acts, policies, or practices that are unreasonable or discriminatory and
burden or restrict U.S. commerce. If a discriminatory practice is found, the United States.
has authority to engage in trade war tactics, such as imposing tariffs on imports, to prevent
or stop the foreign country from imposing a discriminatory measure against the United
States. and its companies.
212
Dispute Settlement, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (last visited Aug. 2, 2021),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_e.htm.
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France’s DST, 84 Fed. Reg., 34042, at 34043 (July 16, 2019).
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twenty-five percent tariff on goods with a trade value of $1.3 billion.217 This
amount was intended to be “comparable, though somewhat lower” than
France’s “expected collections of approximately $450 million in [DST] taxes
from U.S. companies for activities during 2020.” 218 However, the USTR
immediately suspended the tariffs until January 6, 2021 “to allow additional
time for bilateral and multilateral discussions [on global tax deal] that could
lead to a satisfactory resolution.”219 Six days after the suspension expired, the
USTR determined “that the imposition of duties on the current effective date
of January 6, 2021 [is] no longer is appropriate.”220 Thus, the retaliatory tariff
for the DST was suspended indefinitely retroactive to its effective date.221
The timeline of this investigation is summarized in Chart 3.

In addition to France’s case, the USTR imposed tariffs on certain goods
from Austria, India, Italy, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom in June
2021, arguing that the DSTs adopted by those countries discriminate against
U.S. digital companies.222 However, the USTR terminated the investigations
against Brazil, the Czech Republic, the European Union, and Indonesia in
March 2021 as these four jurisdictions have not adopted or implemented
DSTs yet.223
France’s DST, 85 Fed. Reg., 43292, at 43293 (July 16, 2020).
Id.
219
Id.
220
France’s DST, 86 Fed. Reg., 2479, at 2479 (Jan. 12, 2021).
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Id. at 2479–80.
222
USTR Announces, and Immediately Suspends, Tariffs in Section 301 Digital Services
Taxes Investigations, USTR (June 2, 2021), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/pressoffice/press-releases/2021/june/ustr-announces-and-immediately-suspends-tariffs-section301-digital-services-taxes-investigations.
223
USTR, Termination of Section 301 Digital Services Tax Investigations of Brazil, the
Czech Republic, the European Union, and Indonesia (2021).
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Is There Real Discrimination Against American Tech Giants?
On December 2, 2019, the USTR released an investigative report on
France’s DST (the “USTR Report”). The Report concluded that the French
DST is both intentionally and effectually discriminatory. 224 This Subpart
explores in greater detail the USTR’s conclusions on the French DST and
examines the accuracy of the conclusions drawn.
Discrimination can be found in two different ways: 1) “where there is an
intent to discriminate” and 2) “where the effect of the measure is
discriminatory.” 225 Intent discrimination “may be found in the expressed
views of the legislators or regulators to put in place the measure or in the
overall motive of the government in putting in place the measure, as gleaned
from the wordings of the measure itself.”226 Effect discrimination “looks at
whether the measure has a discriminatory effect or impact.”227
It is generally well-accepted that for a DST to be found discriminatory,
there must be more than just intentional discrimination but also strong
evidence of discriminatory effect. 228 Ruth Mason of UVA and Leopoldo
Parada explain that “establishing discriminatory intent is not a necessary
component of every fundamental-freedoms case” but “may be relevant…in
cases involving facially neutral rules that have a discriminatory impact.”229
A finding of discriminatory intent may be used to “trigger impact analysis”
or may even be used to “lower the quantum impact required to establish
nationality discrimination. 230 Therefore, a discrimination claim against a
DST must include evidence of a discriminatory impact, and can be
strengthened with evidence of intent to discriminate.
a) Intent Discrimination
The USTR Report found that intent discrimination exists because of
public statements made by French leaders. 231 For example, 1) “French
224
ROBERT E. LIGHTHIZER, OFF. U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, REPORT ON FRANCE’S
DIGITAL SERVICES TAX 76-77 (Dec. 2, 2019) [hereinafter, USTR REPORT].
225
See Ogbu Okanga, Testing for Consistency: Certain Digital Tax Measures and WTO
Non-discrimination, 55 J. WORLD TRADE __, 9 (forthcoming 2020).
226
Id.
227
Id.
228
See Young Ran (Christine) Kim, Will Digital Services Taxes Start a Global Trade
War?, in THINKER, TEACHER, TRAVELER, REIMAGINING INTERNATIONAL TAX, ESSAYS IN
HONOR OF H. DAVID ROSENBLOOM 287 (Georg Kofler, et al., eds., 2021) [hereinafter, Trade
War].
229
Mason & Parada, The Legality of Digital Taxes in Europe, VA. TAX REV. 18, 18–19
(2020).
230
Id.
231
Id. at 31–35.
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officials repeatedly referred to the French DST, and the EU proposal on
which it was based, as the ‘GAFA tax,’ which stands for Google, Apple,
Facebook, and Amazon, or the ‘GAFAM tax,’ which also includes
Microsoft;” and 2) “French officials have expressed that the DST should
cover the U.S. ‘digital giants’ and not French and European companies, in
order to make the latter group more competitive against the former.”232
Read together, the statements made by French officials paint the picture
that France purposefully designed their DST to discriminate against U.S.
companies. However, when these statements are examined under a different
lens, an alternative interpretation exists, that France is tired of digital
companies not paying their fair share of taxes to the appropriate
sovereignties.233 From France’s standpoint, digital companies have avoided
existing corporate tax rules because current tax laws do not account for the
absence of physical presence based on the digital nature of these
companies.234 As proof that digital companies are avoiding current corporate
taxation rules, the European Commission announced that “on average digital
companies pay an effective tax rate of just 9.5%, whilst traditional enterprises
pay an effective rate of 23.2%.”235
Therefore, although France may have used American companies as the
scape goats of this tax problem, the French statements outline a broader
problem they hope to address with their DST—that digital companies pay
their fair share of taxes and cannot manipulate existing corporate income tax
rules because of their digital nature. Thus, while the USTR Report finds intent
discrimination, there is a plausible alternative argument that France can
make.
b) Effect Discrimination
At this time, it is unclear whether the United States or France will win
the argument pertaining to intent discrimination. However, pervasive
discriminatory intent alone is insufficient “to build a successful tax
discrimination case in international tribunals.” 236 There must also be
evidence of discriminatory impact to successfully make the case of

232

Id. The USTR Report goes on to provide a substantive list of statements made by
French officials to back their two reasons for finding intent discrimination.
233
French officials also complained about digital companies’ ability to escape fair taxes.
See e.g., Alderman, France, supra note 35.
234
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discrimination. 237 This section examines two notable reasons the USTR
Report uses to claim effectual discrimination from France’s DST: (1)
selective bias and (2) revenue thresholds.238
(1) Selective Bias
The United States argues that France’s DST is discriminatory because of
the selection of the services it encompasses. The DST covers two types of
services where U.S. companies are very competitive, namely (a) internet
advertising and (b) digital interfaces, while excluding areas where French and
other European companies are successful.239
Internet Advertising Sector
France characterizes internet advertising under its DST by three
conditions: 1) services marketed to advertisers or their agents; 2) advertising
messages placed on a digital interface; and 3) messages targeted based on
users’ data.240
The USTR Report found that “U.S.-based company groups are highly
successful in the internet advertising sector in France, and the French DST
does not apply to other related sectors like traditional advertising, where
French companies are more successful.”241 As evidence, the USTR Report
notes that eight of the nine groups of internet advertising companies expected
to be covered by France’s DST are U.S.-based, while none are French
companies.242 Thus, the USTR concluded that “the evidence on the record . .
. suggests that the DST’s focus on targeted Internet advertising reflects, and
achieves, French policymakers’ desire to focus the DST on U.S. companies
and not French companies.”243 In summary, France is discriminating against
U.S. companies by choosing to only tax internet advertising, while ignoring
traditional advertising.244
However, the USTR’s analysis is flawed in its inclusion assumption of
traditional advertising companies. The purpose of enacting a digital services
237
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tax is to make sure digital companies are paying their fair share of taxes.
There is no evidence that traditional advertising companies can manipulate
existing corporate income tax rules. Traditional advertising companies are
not exclusively digital in nature, which is the key component digital
companies rely on to avoid paying market country corporate income taxes.
Conversely, U.S.-based traditional advertising companies that were
successful in France, would have a physical presence in France and would
have already paid their fair share of tax to France. Additional tax rules would
not be needed. The USTR’s claim of discrimination is not convincing because
it ignores the origin of the problems.
A better analysis would be determining whether French internet
advertising companies are taking advantage of physical presence corporate
income taxation rules, and if so, whether those French companies are being
excluded from the tax. Or more broadly, if there are non-U.S. internet
advertising companies taking advantage of French corporate income tax laws,
and they are excluded from the DST, there is stronger argument for
discrimination against U.S. companies.
The USTR Report states that “[t]here are French companies that provide
Internet advertising services” and cites to the French Interactive Advertising
Bureau to illustrate the fact that these companies exist. 245 A recent article
published by The Manifest provides the “Top 20 Digital Marketing
Companies in France,”246 Criteo being one example of a large, successful,
French internet advertising company. The companies on the list illustrate that
French internet advertising companies have the potential to take advantage
of corporate income taxation rules due to their digital nature, just like GAFA.
Digital Interfaces
France’s DST only applies to digital platforms or marketplaces where
users can connect with other users for social purposes or to buy and sell goods
or services between themselves, and does not apply to “digital interface”
providers (i.e., a company operating an online marketplace whereby they sell
their own product online in addition to their physical store, such as Walmart
or Target).247
The USTR claims that this “distinction has the effect of excluding French
companies from the scope of the DST while covering their U.S.-based
competitors.”176 The USTR Report lists several French companies they claim
are successful in e-commerce and should be subject the DST, such as
245
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Carrefour (sp), Le Redoute, Cdiscount, Fnac, Vente-Privee, Auchan, and
Showroomprive, but are not covered because of this distinction.177 In fact, on
the digital interfaces side, twelve of the twenty-one company groups that will
be subject to the French DST are U.S.-based; not one French company group
is expected to be covered by the tax.248 The USTR Report noted that “U.S.
companies do not dominate the French market” in the digital interfaces space
and so while there was an opportunity to include French companies who use
a digital interface, France purposefully defined “digital interface services” in
a way to exclude French companies and discriminate against U.S.
companies.249
The USTR claims that this “distinction has the effect of excluding
French companies from the scope of the DST while covering their U.S.-based
competitors.”250 The USTR Report lists several French companies they claim
are successful in e-commerce and should be subject the DST, such as
Carrefour (sp), Le Redoute, Cdiscount, Fnac, Vente-Privee, Auchan, and
Showroomprive, but are not covered because of this distinction.251 Thus, the
USTR believes that France’s definition of digital services is effectually
discriminatory against U.S. companies. In other words, the USTR believes
that France’s definition of digital services is effectually discriminatory
against U.S. companies
The USTR Report also notes that the French DST and EU DST proposal
carve out types of digital interfaces where European or French companies are
particularly successful, such as online music sales. 252 When the EU DST
proposal carved out “digital content,” commentators suggested that this was
to avoid covering the Swedish music streaming giant Spotify. France also
carved out “digital content,” allowing them to avoid taxing Spotify and the
French company Deezer. However, France eliminated the “digital content”
carve-out as applied to apps, where two U.S. companies (Apple and Google)
are the dominant sellers globally.253 Therefore, this aspect of the French DST
seems discriminatory toward U.S. companies.
However, one pitfall in the USTR’s analysis is that many of the French
companies described in the USTR Report are primarily traditional retailers
and are not digital platform companies. These traditional retailers may have
online components for selling products carried in-store, but these traditional
retailers are not operating a digital interface in the way that Google, Amazon,
Facebook, and Apple are. As noted earlier, the problem DSTs are attempting
248
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to solve arises through their ability to engage in profit shifting activities and
tax nexus avoidance in foreign countries based on lack of physical presence.
The French companies mentioned in the USTR Report already have tax nexus
with France because they are physically located within the country. Because
there is no tax nexus issue, France reasonably excluded these types of
companies from their DST.
(2) Revenue Thresholds
The USTR argues that the revenue thresholds of France’s DST are
effectively discriminatory because “the revenue thresholds focus the DST on
U.S.-based company groups and exclude many non-U.S.-based companies
that supply the covered services in France.”254
France’s DST only applies to companies that earn annual revenues from
supplying the covered services of €750 million globally and €25 million in
France.255 The rationale for such high revenue thresholds in a DST seems to
be “to target tech giants that enjoy monopoly power and yet do not pay
enough tax in the market countries.”256 Therefore, the USTR claims that the
high revenue thresholds effectively discriminate against U.S. companies by
excluding French companies from DST liability while subjecting U.S.
companies to the tax.257
A possible counter to this argument is that the threshold requirements are
not selectively targeting U.S. companies, as any country’s digital company
above the threshold is subject to the tax. In terms of effect discrimination,
however, there is a good argument to be made that France likely knew that
setting high thresholds would limit the effect of its DST to prominent
American digital companies.
The USTR notes that there are non-U.S.-based companies that supply
covered targeted advertising services. 258 A majority of the corporate
members of the French Interactive Advertising Bureau are French. 259
Additionally, there are many traditional French advertising companies that
also provide internet advertising services as part of their business, such as
Publicis and Havas.260 However, neither business meets both DST revenue
thresholds.261
254
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The USTR Report concludes that because of the revenue thresholds
“twelve of the twenty-one company groups expected to be covered by the
DST with respect to ‘digital interface’ services are U.S.-based” and no French
companies are expected to be covered. 262 The USTR Report provides
examples of French companies that supply digital interface services in the
French market,263 yet despite their substantial revenues, are excluded from
the DST.
As an initial observation, it is doubtful that the purpose of the DST is to
target French companies that provide some internet advertising services as
non-primary parts of their business. These companies already have tax nexus
with France and the USTR has provided no evidence that these businesses
are able to avoid their fair share of tax compared to digital companies.
Therefore, the USTR’s claim that the French DST is effectively
discriminatory is weakened by the fact that the French companies who
provide internet advertising services as part of their business cannot avoid tax
like other digital companies because tax nexus is already established due to
physical presence in France.
For example, the USTR report states that Orange, S.A., a French
multinational telecommunications company, should and would be subject to
the DST if it were not for the revenue thresholds.264 However, Orange S.A.
provides telecommunication services similar to the U.S. companies Verizon
and AT&T, and its internet advertising services performed are programmatic
targeted internet advertising services similar to those offered by Verizon and
AT&T in the U.S. in the form of commercials and ads. These
telecommunication companies are not providing the same type of internet
platform services like Google offers and are therefore less likely to engage in
profit shifting activities.
However, some examples provided by the USTR provide a strong
argument in favor of discrimination. For example, the Report listed SoLocal
Group, a group of digital advertising companies that works with over 700,000
advertisers to reach individuals across Europe. 265 SoLocal Group’s business
is more in line with the internet advertising the DST attempts to tax because
their digital nature allows them to provide services in foreign countries
without physical presence, which creates opportunities for profit shifting.266
In 2017, SoLocal Group recorded €755.8 million in total revenue, including
€635.8 million in Internet revenues. SoLocal Group escapes DST because
their Internet revenues were less than the French threshold of €750 million
262
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required to subject them to the tax. The USTR may further investigate why
France set the revenue threshold at €750 million, although France is expected
to respond that it merely followed the global trend—that is, most DSTs, either
currently in effect or in consideration, offer similar amounts as global revenue
thresholds. 267 Nonetheless, this point is more effective than the case of
Orange S.A.
In short, despite some merit, the Article notes the USTR Report’s biases
and exaggerations to reach the conclusion that France’s DST is
discriminatory.
The Case Against Retaliatory Tariffs
Retaliatory tariffs will likely harm the United States without having a
deterring effect. This section examines a case where tariffs were imposed on
French sparking wine to retaliate Frances’ proposed DST and demonstrates
that such retaliatory tariffs have neither caused financial harm to the French
wine industry nor have pressured France to discard its DST.
Economists consistently indicate that international free trade and the
elimination of protectionist measures benefit every nation involved and that
tariffs are inefficient and harmful to economies.268 In particular, economist
Kimberly Clausing of UCLA provides four reasons that tariffs “add insult to
injury” for American workers. 269 Her four reasons are: (1) Tariffs act as
regressive taxes on consumption, (2) tariffs and trade wars wreak havoc on
U.S. labor markets by raising costs for American companies, (3) trading
partners often retaliate when tariffs are raised on their imports, and (4) trade
wars harm the global economy resulting in weakened alliances.270 In addition
to economists supporting free trade, Clausing argues that open economic
policies are in the best interest of American workers.271
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The four reasons against tariffs manifest in DST tariffs as well. To
illustrate, consider the U.S. importers of French sparkling wine affected by
the retaliatory DST tariffs.272 The U.S. sparkling wine importers are chosen
by the USTR as “sacrificial companies” to protect GAFA (Google, Apple,
Facebook, and Amazon), or “protected companies” arguably harmed by
foreign nation discrimination. Theoretically, importers of French sparkling
wine would suffer no economic impact because tariffs related to France’s
DST were immediately suspended. However, Chart 4 shows the increased
imports prior to an anticipated tariff and decreased imports coinciding with
the actual tariff, compared to the constant quantity of import of Italian
sparkling wine where no additional duties were threatened. 273 Chart 5
confirms this observation, and shows that twenty-five percent tariff proposal
can result in a seventy percent reduction in import, meaning reduced profits.

272

Data for this case study was collected and analyzed by Laura Kent-Jensen (B.S.
Stanford University, Founder and former CEO of a wine import company, Bon Vivant
Imports, Inc.) (data used with permission, on file with the authors).
273
The rebound effect after July 2020 was because importers were certain at that time
of the 6-month suspension.
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In addition, wine that an importer continues to purchase suddenly costs
twenty-five percent more than it had due to the tariff. If the importer absorbs
some of that cost, profit margins are reduced. If the importer passes along the
increased cost, that impacts companies downstream in the value chain.274 It
may take time for the tariff incidence to reach its ultimate destination, the
consumer. However, given a stable consumer price index for alcoholic
beverages throughout the period shown in Chart 6, 275 it is reasonable to
conclude that the DST tariff creates negative effects for sacrificial companies
that will ripple throughout the supply chain.

274

To evaluate the effect on downstream businesses, the most applicable data to measure
the adverse effects would be lost sales and lost jobs. However, the authors did not find the
merits to exhibit the results here because the timeline of the DST tariff significantly overlaps
the COVID pandemic. The pandemic effects on data are so pronounced that it is difficult to
draw conclusions about the lost sales and lost job as effects of retaliatory tariffs. For sales,
Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) tracks retail sales for wine at liquor store and
restaurant sales (data on file with authors), but the increase in retail sales and sharp decrease
of restaurant sales in March 2020 coincides with the start of the pandemic, so that consumers
changing their purchasing habits of alcoholic beverages due to the pandemic is a much more
likely explanation for the increase in retail sales of alcoholic beverages. For employment,
restaurant employment plummeted sixty-seven percent during the initial COVID outbreak
and remained more than forty percent below pre-COVID rates. However, the effects of the
COVID pandemic again overwhelm any discernible pattern.
275
FRED provides information on consumer pricing. The data does not distinguish wine
pricing within the category of alcoholic beverages, but it provides a record of pricing for
consumption in the home and at bars and restaurants, using an index set to 100 in 1983.
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Another critical question is whether the tariff has its intended effect on
the foreign country—in this case, France. Again, the implied objective of
retaliatory tariffs is to create an adverse financial effect on the foreign
nation’s market significant enough to induce the country to eliminate its
discriminatory trade practices. However, DST tariffs neither caused
discernable financial harm to the French wine industry nor has France
abandoned its DST. First, Chart 7 is Eurostat’s consumer price index for wine
in Europe by country of origin. One might expect that intended consequences
of DST tariffs would result in a decrease in U.S. import from targeted
countries, such as France, Spain, and the United Kingdom (as opposed to
Italy and Portugal that were not targeted), and thus decrease in prices of the
targeted wines in the months after October 2019, and again after January
2021 when tariffs were implemented. However, despite the decrease in U.S.
imports of wines from the targeted countries like France, there is not a
corresponding decrease in pricing in the home country. This means that the
countries like France were able to sell their wines in other markets.
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Second, DST tariffs did not effectively motivate France to abandon its
DST. The underlying issue of how to collect tax revenues from companies
that provide value within France but do not meet physical presence
requirements continues and, therefore as the USTR acknowledges, France
intends to continue with its DST. Not only is France’s DST in effect in 2021,
but several other countries considered DSTs of their own. 276 Ultimately,
retaliatory tariffs have failed to eliminate France’s DST, and they have failed
to discourage other countries from enacting similar measures. Perhaps in
recognition of the ineffectiveness of retaliatory tariffs to halt DSTs, the
United States postponed the effective date of the tariff in July 2020,277 before
permanently suspending the tariff in January 2021.278
As such, the tariffs failed to achieve the primary stated objective of
causing foreign countries to eliminate their objectionable trade practices. The
most favorable view is that the tariff encouraged foreign countries to consider
changes to their practices and to continue discussions with the United States
to achieve better solutions. However, the option to negotiate modified or
improved agreements with foreign nations is a statutory action available to
the USTR even without tariffs.279 In the worst case, the tariffs can be seen as

276

See supra Part I.A.
France’s DST, 85 Fed. Reg., 43292, at 43292 (July 16, 2020).
278
France’s DST, 86 Fed. Reg., 2479, at 2479 (Jan. 12, 2021).
279
19 U.S.C. § 2411(c) (2018).
277
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an aggressive, noncooperative act that may encourage a nonproductive trade
war and exacerbate the harmful effects of the tariff itself.
Even when additional objectives are considered, such as “pressuring
affected countries into broader negotiations,”280 the lack of economic impact
on those foreign countries calls the effectiveness into question. Perhaps it is
not the actual economic impact of tariffs, but the threat of the tariffs and the
prospect of an escalating trade war that serves as the pressure.
Furthermore, additional negative impacts from tariffs may arise when
countries retaliate with their own tariffs, such as impacting unrelated
industries. 281 For example, former President Trump’s steel and aluminum
tariffs resulted in retaliatory Chinese tariffs against exported American
goods, specifically soybeans. 282 This retaliatory measure affected a U.S.
industry that is otherwise removed from both the steel and aluminum
industries. To combat this industry-shifting burden created by tariffs, Trump
offered to cease future tariffs on automobiles and automobile parts in
exchange for the E.U. Commissioner’s agreement to lower their own
retaliatory tariffs and expand imports of liquified natural gas and soybeans.283
In brief, although the USTR claims of discrimination may justify starting
a trade war, some of their claims are flawed. Hence, before taking trade-war
actions, policymakers must consider the potential radiating effects.
Retaliatory actions may have a far-reaching impact beyond initial concerns
of sacrificing the value of free trade and may expand into a multi-party trade
war. Throughout the course of a trade war, the harm befalls on U.S.
consumers. When the trade war escalates, U.S. consumers as well as small
and medium businesses—sacrificial companies—will suffer from higher
prices due to tariffs on imported goods and services. From an electoral
perspective, it is unlikely that American consumers will be sympathetic to
policymakers starting a trade war to protect tech giants who are thriving in
the wake of COVID-19.

280

CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45529, TRUMP ADMINISTRATION TARIFF ACTIONS:
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 2 (2019).
281
Csongor Istvan Nagy, World Trade, Imperial Fantasies and Protectionism: Can You
Really Have Your Cake and Eat It Too, 26 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 87, 96 (2019)
(“Retaliatory measures may target an industry other than the protected sector.”).
282
Jacob Ely, The "National Security" of Nations: President Trump's Pretextual Tariff
Rationale and How to Overcome It, 3 INT’L COMP. POL’Y & ETHICS L. REV. 241, 257
(2019).
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ALTERNATIVES TO PILLAR ONE
Previous Parts demonstrated the limitations of current digital tax reform
proposals and advises guideline for the U.S. reaction. This Part provides
normative proposals for digital taxation, first offering policy criteria and then
developing multilateral and unilateral alternatives.
Criteria for Digital Taxation Policy
Proposing normative alternatives to Pillar One should start with
developing the criterion for sound “digital tax” policy. The three problems
that this Article aims to solve given the issues and concerns discussed above
are as follows: First, reflecting the tax challenges in the digital economy, a
policy proposal should be able to overcome the outdated tax nexus physical
presence requirement and fairly allocate the appropriate tax revenue to
market countries. Furthermore, an effective policy proposal should be free
from any indicia that can be viewed as discriminatory towards companies
based on nationality. Finally, a policy proposal needs to be administrable by
both tax administrations and taxpayers alike. A simple, targeted approach
may in fact work better and more efficiently than an ambitious,
comprehensive approach that inevitably invites political compromises.
The traditional criteria for evaluating tax policy are equity (or fairness),
economic efficiency, and administrability (or simplicity).284 What criteria, if
any, for digital tax policy can be derived from them? After we discuss the
traditional criteria, we will connect them with the policy rationales stated in
the Pillar One Blueprint.
One might suppose that whether a tax proposal makes multinationals pay
their fair share of taxes to market countries relates to the equity prong.
However, economists tend to explain this issue under the efficiency prong,
because proposals to reallocate taxing rights to markets address taxpayers’
incentives to shift profits and avoid taxes.285 In fact, the fairness in a digital
tax proposal not only relates to fairness among countries but also to fairness
284

For an early statement of the traditional criteria, see ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO
NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776). For a comprehensive
discussion of tax policy criteria, see MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, DEBORAH H. SCHENK, & ANNE L.
ALSTOTT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 28–32 (8th ed., 2018);
ALLISON CHRISTIANS, INTRODUCTION TO TAX POLICY THEORY (2018), available at
https:/ssrn.com/abstract=3186791.
285
See e.g., Richard Collier, Michael P. Devereux & John Vella, Comparing Proposals
to Tax Some Profit in the Market Country 10 (May 4, 2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on
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among taxpayers, which implicates issues of tax incidence—that is, who
bears economic burden of such tax. A group of scholars in Oxford University
argue that the incidence of such tax depends on the conditions in each market
where multinationals operate, and thus, identifying the tax incidence is
“almost impossible.” 286 Thus, they emphasize the economic efficiency and
ease of administration instead to evaluate a digital tax proposal based on
fairness. It is also argued that taxation of business profit, in general, cannot
be assessed in terms of fairness. Businesses adjust their behavior in response
to taxation. Taxation affects the prices of goods and services sold, as well as
the prices of inputs used, including employee wages. Where the burden falls
on the income distribution is difficult to determine. Without identifying its
incidence, we cannot assess its progressivity or regressivity.287
Economic efficiency and administrability have inconsistent implications
for digital tax policy. To maximize the profits allocation to market countries,
the scope of the new digital tax proposal should be as broad as possible.
However, where scope is defined by sector, the administrability prong
suggests limiting the number of sectors — fewer complex revenue sourcing
rules have to be designed and implemented.288 To prevent companies from
reclassifying their activities to avoid market taxation, tax authorities will need
to police the boundary between activities that are within and without scope.289
Defining scope by a very high threshold amount, as the Statement does,
“offers unambiguous administrative advantages.” 290 This can make the
proposal simple, but it may be less precise and too generalizing.
Under the principle of economic efficiency, a tax should be neutral. It
should not distort economic outcomes. This has implications for the
definition of “market” countries. In the context of digital taxation, efficiency
requires minimizing distortion to the location choices of multinationals. To
do so, the location of the tax base should be determined by immobile
factors. 291 Indirect purchasers or users will not move in response to the
multinational’s new tax liability. Therefore, the “market” should be defined
to include the location of indirect purchasers or users, as opposed to direct
286

Id.
See MICHAEL P. DEVEREUX, ALAN J. AUERBACH, MICHAEL KEEN, PAUL
OOSTERHUIS, WOLFGANG SCHÖN, & JOHN VELLA, TAXING PROFIT IN A DIGITAL ECONOMY
34–37 (1st ed. 2021).
288
The proposed source rules are in preliminary form. Key details on each of their
general principles have been left to the forthcoming Commentary. If the source rules are
complex now, imagine what their next iteration will look like. See e.g., Stephanie Soong
Johnston, OECD Working to Cut Revenue Sourcing Complexity, Tax Chief Says, 105 TAX
NOTES INT’L 936 (2022).
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purchasers alone. However, defining the “market” as such will increase
administrative costs. Revenue sourcing rules will be made even more
complex by the need to look through sets of transactions for indirect
purchasers or users.
Let us now connect the discussion above to the policy rationale of the
Pillar One Blueprint. The Blueprint provides the foundation for an agreement
“that would adhere to the concept of net taxation of income, avoid double
taxation and be as simple and administrable as possible.”292 Should the new
tax be on a net basis, specifically residual profit? Residual profit is similar to
economic rent, although not equivalent, and thus, a net basis tax targeting
residual profit would be less distortionary. However, tax on a gross basis is
easier to collect. Since it does not take costs into account, revenue is easier to
identify. While net basis taxation is more efficient, gross basis taxation is
easier to administer with less opportunity to manipulate revenue sourcing
rules. 293 Although that tips the scale slightly, the choice between net and
gross basis taxation is not clear enough to declare one a criterion of “digital
tax” policy. The prevention of double taxation (and of double non-taxation)
is the purpose of the tax treaty network. Thus, any digital tax proposal should
have a mechanism to eliminate double taxation.
The next two sections propose multilateral and unilateral alternatives and
evaluate the pros and cons as per such criteria discussed in this section.
The U.N. Proposal as a Multilateral Alternative
Article 12B of the U.N. Model Tax Convention is the UN’s response to
the taxation of the digital economy and to the taxation of income from
services. Approved in April 2021, article 12B eliminates the physical
presence requirement and expands the taxing rights of market countries for
the income from Automated Digital Services.294
The scope is limited to Automated Digital Services, defined as “any
service provided on the internet or an electronic network requiring minimal
human involvement from the service provider.”295 Note that this definition is
substantially similar to the definition in the Pillar One Blueprint. However,
no minimum threshold is prescribed for revenue or profitability.
According to the Model Tax Convention, the country where income
from Automated Digital Services arises may tax the income on a gross basis
via a withholding tax, unless the income constitutes royalties or fees for
technical services. The source jurisdiction is the state of the (direct) purchaser
292

OECD, PILLAR ONE BLUEPRINT, supra note 38, at 8.
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from which the payment is made, not necessarily the state where an indirect
purchaser or user resides. If the income from Automated Digital Services is
attributable to a permanent establishment in the source jurisdiction, it is
excluded. Tax on gross income is capped at a rate to be negotiated between
treaty partners.296 U.N.’s Commentary to article 12B suggests a modest rate
(three or four percent) as treaty rates.297
In addition, taxpayers may elect to be taxed on a net basis.298 This option
provides relief when the taxpayer has: (i) a lower tax liability than the liability
determined under the withholding tax mechanism; (ii) a global business loss;
or (iii) a loss in the relevant business segment during a taxable year.
Article 12B has noteworthy merits and this Article believes it superior
to Pillar One. The physical presence requirement for tax nexus has been
addressed and dispensed with, and more profits can be allocated to market
countries. Article 12B’s option of gross or net basis taxation may be its
greatest strength for those who believe that income, not revenue, is the
appropriate basis for corporate taxation. Article 12B is also simpler to
implement than Pillar One. It does not require business segmentation based
on activity and applies different rules to each segment unless net basis
taxation is elected. Even then, consolidated financial statements may be used.
It simplifies both tax administration and compliance. The withholding tax
mechanism is a reliable and efficient method for collecting tax, because
taxpayers are not required to compute their net profits or file tax returns.
Furthermore, article 12B builds on established foundations. For instance,
article 23 (Methods for the elimination of double taxation) is already in place
to deal with double taxation. A caveat for the United States is that it needs to
offer foreign tax credit against the U.S. tax even though the tax paid to market
countries is gross basis. However, such foreign tax credit issues persist even
under the Pillar One regime as long as the new tax imposed by market
countries is regulated under tax treaties.
Because article 12B is in the U.N. Model Tax Convention, it is supposed
to be included in, and implemented by, a bilateral tax treaty between countries
who want to model this approach. However, it may also serve as a better
proposal for a multilateral instrument than Pillar One’s approach.

296

Id. at 6, ¶ 2.
Id. at 14, ¶ 28.
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For net basis taxation, taxpayer may require the source country to tax its qualified
profits, defined as 30 percent of the amount resulting from applying the profitability ratio to
the gross annual revenue from automated digital services. Id. at 6, ¶ 3; 13–14, ¶ 26–27.
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A Data Excise Tax as a Unilateral Alternative
This section proposes a unilateral alternative to Pillar One. After
evaluating two data tax proposals, the New York Data Mining Tax and Omri
Marian’s Data Tax Proposal, and identifying the benefits and detriments of
both, it proposes its own proposal, a Data Excise Tax.
Existing Proposals
In a perfect storm of jurisdictional need for revenue and tech giants
bursting at the seams with cash during an otherwise devastating time for
businesses, various countries have enacted DSTs.299 As a result of the desire
to harness the growth of the digital economy, not less than ten states in the
United States are also enacting or proposing various types of DSTs, using
these countries as models.300 Maryland’s Digital Advertising Tax, effective
on January 1, 2022, is the frontrunner.301 There is a novel Data Mining Tax
by New York, 302 which gives insights on how to improve not only
subnational DSTs but also international DSTs.
New York’s Data Mining Tax is an excise tax on the collection of New
York consumer data measured by the number of New York Residents data is
collected from. 303 The taxpayer is the commercial data collector, not the
user. 304 The rate structure of this tax is progressive, commercial data
collectors who collect data from between 1–2 million New York residents
will pay $0.05 per resident per month.305 At the far end of the progressive
structure, the tax rate increases to $0.50 per New York resident plus $2.25
million where commercial data collectors are collecting data from more than
10 million New York residents each month.
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This proposal has been praised for several aspects of its design. First, the
tax is less discriminatory due to the application threshold being based on
users rather than gross receipts.306 Second, the conventional progressive rate
structure eliminates severe “notch” or “cliff” effects. Taxpayers pay the same
amount of tax based on how many users’ data is collected from in the taxable
period, subjecting the largest collectors to a higher rate; but higher rates are
only paid on each New York resident beyond the specified threshold. Third,
because this tax directly taxes data collection, some commentators
recommend this tax if jurisdictions want to impose a tax on the value
associated with collecting and monetizing user data, whereas using digital
advertising as a proxy for that value is ineffective.307
Despite the many positive features, there are a few drawbacks. One being
the tax’s extreme effectiveness at raising revenue, businesses facing
exorbitant tax bills may withdraw from jurisdictions or pass portions of the
tax burden onto customers. 308 Furthermore, there are generally some
reservations to excise taxes. As a result, the Council on State Taxation warned
New York lawmakers that they are generally opposed to excise taxes on
business inputs and subjecting commercial data collectors to this tax would
result in double taxation. 309 Additionally, commenters argue that this tax
would result in significant record-keeping issues for commercial data
collectors, citing concerns of counting the same New York resident more than
once during the taxable period, the difficulty of determining whether the
person they collected the data from is a New York resident, and the tax may
potentially affect a company’s ability to keep data anonymous.310
In the same vein, Omri Marian proposes a theoretical framework for a
data tax similar to the proposed New York Data Mining Tax.311 Marian’s data
tax is an excise tax with a broader tax base based on volume of data, measured
via gigabytes, rather than per resident.312
The crux of Marians idea is as follows: “Data is the value, so it is being
taxed as such. Not as a proxy for some other measurement of value.”313 He
poses three principles for the data tax; (1) volume (not value) of raw data
comprises the tax base, (2) all data uses are included in the tax base, and (3)
306
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the taxpayer is the user of the data.314 In Marian’s proposal both uploads and
downloads are taxable and measurable.315
Marian argues that ascribing monetary value to data is an
insurmountable and logically incoherent task, which is why the proposal
attempts to avoid attributing monetary value to the data, and instead taxes its
volume.316 This is beneficial because “[a] tax on data volume has the benefit
of being self-adjusting.”317 Development in the legal system, including the
tax system, is considered sluggish compared to the pace of technological
development. However, taxing the raw commodity, in this case—the data—
will allow the tax to adjust to technological advances because the more
advanced technology, the more data used, and thus, the higher the tax.318
It is also worth noting Marian’s justification for an excise tax as a data
tax. Generally, excise taxes are criticized for being regressive. However,
Marian argues that this data tax is progressive because it is a direct tax on
data owners, arguably targeting the “data-rich” that are able to avoid income
taxes, but not the “data-poor” who are unable to avoid those taxes.319 Marian
also indicates that a direct data tax as an excise tax is efficient and easily
administrable because the tax is collected where the data is collected, making
the sourcing issue manageable, and measuring the volume of data is possible,
as shown by cellphone companies.320
New Proposal
Inspired by the two proposals discussed above, this Subpart proposes a
direct Data Excise Tax as an alternative unilateral measure to DSTs. The
details of the E.U.’s forthcoming digital levy are undetermined, but the
Article believes that the proposed Data Tax would offer a good benchmark
for the E.U., resolving various policy concerns discussed throughout this
Article. Furthermore, the proposed Data Excise Tax is not only helpful to
foreign countries, but also the fifty states considering an improved
subnational digital taxation mechanism.
The tax base of the proposed Data Excise Tax is volume of collected
data, measured in gigabytes. It does not adopt the New York’s Data Mining
Tax’s per capita measurement, which imposes the same amount of tax to
commercial data collectors for the data of heavy users and that of light users,
314
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because each user counts only once regardless of the amount of data collected
from those two users. That is neither efficient nor fair.321 Also, this proposal
is different from Marian’s proposal in terms that it only taxes the volume of
collected (or downloaded) data, and thus uploads are irrelevant.
To illustrate, consider the hypothetical example of William. William,
who lives in the UK, wants to purchase a new car. William is particularly
interested in a mid-size luxury German sedan, and he begins the car buying
process by “googling” key words like “10 best sedans for 2021.” Google
shows search results, such as sedans by Toyota, Hyundai, Mercedes-Benz EClass, Audi A7, and BMW 5 Series. The search results include an
advertisement of Mercedes-Benz E-Class. William skips Toyota, Hyundai,
and only clicks Mercedes-Benz E-Class, Audi A7, and BMW 5 Series.
For Google, the data of “10 best sedans for 2021” collected from William
is meaningful, because the algorithm processes that data associated with
William’s existing information as well as big data from other users and can
produce a tailored result. The information that William clicks only MercedesBenz E-Class, Audi A7, and BMW 5 Series is also substantial, because now
Google has data of William’s preference. Thus, Google is required to pay the
proposed Data Excise Tax on the collected (or downloaded) data from
William—i.e., “10 best sedans for 2021” and the user’s click of MercedesBenz E-Class, Audi A7, and BMW 5 Series.
However, Google is not required to pay the proposed Data Excise Tax
on its uploaded search results, including advertisement of Mercedes-Benz EClass. As a platform, Google serves two or more distinct groups of customers
or users.322 In this case, William for online search business, and MercedesBenz for online advertising business. Users on one side of the market
(William) are charged little to nothing to participate, while the users on the
other side (Mercedes-Benz) are charged all or the majority of the profits.
Thus, when displaying the search results to William, Google may have earned
321
In that regard, the New York’s Data Mining Tax may have similar flaws to head
count taxes, which are somewhat rare, violative of principles of fairness due to its regressive
nature, and can be difficult to administer in some countries, including the United States.
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Byrne, Locke, Property, and Progressive Taxes, 78 NEB. L. REV. 700, 733 (1999); Karl
Manheim, The Health Insurance Mandate – A Tax or a Taking, 42 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
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income from Mercedes from its online advertisement business, but such
income can be taxed under the existing income tax system. Tax reform is
necessary to capture the other side of digital business, the exchange between
Google and William.
Because there is no cash flow between Google and William, it has been
challenging for market countries (UK) to collect tax from Google which
easily operates in the UK without physical presence. However, the proposed
Data Excise Tax provides tax revenue to market jurisdictions (UK) where
data providers (user William) are located. Thus, it fulfills the goal of revenue
reallocation in favor of market countries. It also overcomes the physical
presence requirement in tax nexus, because the tax will be imposed on data
collectors regardless of their location, onshore or offshore.
Both the New York Data Mining Tax and Marian’s proposal offer use of
IP addresses as a way to determine which (market) jurisdiction will tax the
data collection. There has been opposition to use of IP addresses due to their
susceptibility to manipulation. However, as Marian indicated, if someone
does use a VPN, and these taxes are implemented on a wide scale, the data
tax will be imposed on the VPN service provider as well.323 In other words,
it generates more revenue, instead of being vulnerable to loopholes.
Furthermore, this Article proposes that the taxpayer be limited to forprofit commercial data collectors, similar to the taxpayer identified in the
New York Data Tax. Differing from Marian’s proposal, not all users of data
would be part of the identifiable tax base. Safe harbor thresholds should be
created to protect individual users and small businesses. The tax would be
directed at businesses using and profiting from the data collected, not at those
who offer the data for free.
The proposed Data Excise Tax is not measured in gross revenue or
profits, and thus is an improvement compared to DSTs. DSTs have been
criticized as a disguised income tax, resulting in double taxation—once by
the existing income tax and again by DSTs as disguised income tax. 324
However, the tax base of the Data Excise Tax this Article proposes is the
volume of collected data, which clearly distinguishes from income tax. Also,
as an excise tax, the Data Excise Tax would be easy to administer, and can
be implemented independently or together with the multilateral alternative
infra Part IV.B. It may be very attractive to many governments seeking a
practical solution regardless of the global solution.
Joe Bankman, Alan Sykes of Stanford Law School and Mitchell Kane of
NYU imply that a well-designed excise tax would be a better tool to extract
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the profits of multinationals than conventional income tax. 325 However,
excise taxes are often criticized for being regressive. 326 Although Marian
offers an excellent argument for the progressivity of a direct data tax, without
empirical data it is not certain how progressive or regressive a data excise tax
would be. To mitigate the regressivity issue, this Article recommends a
progressive rate structure with graduated thresholds based on the number of
gigabytes of data collected in each jurisdiction.
The final point is whether the proposed Data Excise Tax would be
discriminatory against American tech giants. The proposal itself has nothing
to do with the residence of businesses, and thus facially neutral. However,
given that American tech giants are dominating the market, it is inevitable
that majority of taxpayers of the proposed Data Excise Tax would be
American multinationals. Then, one might find that this proposal would be
no less discriminatory than the France’s DST case discussed in Part III.C.
Will the United States again use the card of discrimination no matter how the
reform proposal would be improved? The Article hopes not, but if so, that
discussion will be reserved for the authors’ next project.

CONCLUSION
Despite the critiques in this Article, the Statement for a global deal
represents a remarkable step forward toward implementing an international
tax regime fit for the 21st century. Pillar One eliminates, for Amount A, the
obsolete physical presence requirement as well as the unworkable arm’s
length standard for transfer pricing, and finally recognizes the crucial role of
market jurisdictions in generating income. Pillar Two implements the single
tax principle, meaning that corporate profits should be subject to a minimum
tax and that if the country with the primary right to tax such income (source
or residence) does not impose tax at the minimum level, the other country
involved should tax it.
All of these are decisive breaks from the past, which have been suggested
for 25 years but until now have gained little traction. This Article welcomes
the momentum for international tax reform. However, like most historical
developments, the Inclusive Framework encompasses both revolution and
evolution, and each building block has different prospects for success. In
325
Joseph Bankman, Mitchell Kane & Alan Sykes, Collecting the Rent: The Global
Battle to Capture MNE Profits, 72 TAX L. REV. 197, 230–32 (2020).
326
Marian, Taxing Data, supra note 317, at 14; JOSEPH PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY
199–200 (5th ed. 1987) (excise taxes are viewed as regressive because individuals pay the
same amount of tax regardless of income); Henry N. Butler & Jason S. Johnston, Reforming
State Consumer Protection Liability: An Economic Approach, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1
(2010).
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particular, Pillar Two has greater potential for success with global support. In
contrast, Pillar One has sizeable political and logistical challenges that will
be difficult to overcome in addition to potential reluctance to repeal DSTs.
In light of these difficulties, this Article recommends separating the two
Pillars and pursuing Pillar Two during the global negotiation should Pillar
One fail. Pillar One may have alternatives worth examining. This Article
focuses on the U.N. proposal and a Data Excise Tax as such alternatives, but
there may be others, such as a formulary apportionment in transfer pricing.
Furthermore, starting a trade war to protect American Tech Giants is
imprudent, because, in the course of a trade war, U.S. consumers and small
and medium businesses will be the ones suffering. Given that American tech
giants are dominating the global digital economy, it is conceivable that they
will pay the largest tax bill, as their “fair share of tax,” to market countries
under any tax reform proposal.
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